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Volume I 




Volame 1 


'm& cmm of staff 



fiice 15 cento 


Washington, April 10, IBSO. 

This provisional msatial deaU with the employment of large 
units in both open and stabilized warfare. It is assumed tliat 
the enemy is equal in intelligence to ourselves anrl that he is as 
well armed, trained, and supplied. 

This manual is intended as a guide for comniandcrB and staffs 
of divisions, corps, arniics, Miid groups of armies, and for general 
headquarters. It contemplates the employment of forces vary- 
ing in strength from a single division to the maximum mobilised 
man power of the Nation. Throughout the manual, the term 
"large unit" is applied to, the division, oorps, army, and group 
of armies. 

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Bt OBDAtt or tob I^xtars op Was: 


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Major Genm-ai, 

Tht A-dgvittnt OmeraL 



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t. Tlwtimy: 

ItebnoN I. a«iiand 30-35 U 

lU. TlM«nii7 ln d^biidm b«tiaiu^.i. iMH IS 

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m. The owpt 111 drtiMiTB bmte^ji^— .— N-n at 
T. Tlwliduitrr dtvlslan: 

Bnnos L Oioersl T4-TT 3S 

n. The tnfentry dlvlBloc to ofleosiTa battle.. T8-8J 41 

ni. The InfSD try tUTlalan [a dslamaive t>*tUe.. M-»7 St 
& TlM cavalry ecips and the csrsfer dlviiloii: 

SacnoK I. The cavalry aacst- „^.^...„,^ 98 «j) 

n. Th«e*mb;^dfviiloiB._..w^» «M10 HI 

9, Speotal (qMtatfaniK 

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It Wood! and vUleges 114-Iia (8 

m. HountiiiQ cmiQtry...^ IIT-US <W 

IV. During periods of Jtmlted'd^ lIS-121 TO 

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...... -,,1 1 U> .- ' . ■ ■ ■ : ■ ■ • : i 

■ -i: • .! ■. h ir I GfiASTJ^-'l' ■ . .• ■ - . ■! . ^^i 

1. The comnuoiideF.^ — Gommaiid haa ever been the most Im- 
portaat element In war. The commander m&kes the unit, 
whatever may be Its size or strength. As is the commander, bo 
la the unit. Success can be ivssured only through the skillful 
handlkig of troops. The comniander must have a thorough 
comprehension of war and of the possibilities of offensive and 
defensive action. He must be able to make his ideas KQd con- 
cteptloiiis.pftnneata Ms command bq. thoroughJy thai enrsry'psrl 
fi{^tt;)«d& Afft In time at eMs, as Itimnold ftCit, If He weEe:>i»«stot 
«ttli>«aeh particular ui^i' 3Sii0';<»HiamaiBler df a luge ur^ te fbe 
controlling and responsible head. He shotUd Impress himself 
upon his command by his ability, a^fytudeiiiwsoessibility, breadth 
of interest, experieticc, inflexibility of purpose, kindliness toward 
Individuals, loyalty to superiors and subordinates, and devotion 
to cause and country. Above all, he should enjoy a reputation i 
for success. 

The commander should have tl^^e conceptions ever before 
him; the humannature of his warrmakicg machine, t^ mate- 
rial oondlthmB under whkhiMU operating^ and the' Tsaction of 
the mtm^. He should avoids harassing his'tioopa ^lirougb 'fanli]^ 
staff manf^ment, by subjecting them to useless hardships, by 
neglect of their health and comfort, and by frittering away lives 
and strength in inconsequential aetiona. 

3. Duties. — Wars arc fought with men. The commander can 
not be too careful of the unit tliat the State has committed to 
his charge. He must pay the greatest attention to the health of 
his men, to the supply of food, clothing, and shelter, and to the 
provision for rest and comfort. His first object: should be to 
secure the love and attachm^t of his men bjF thi« ffoiffitant 
for their well-belngj The ctevotion that aiiaes from this kind- of 
attention kno\ro no bounds and enables him to exact prodigies of 
valor on the day of battle. 

Morale Lb created by superiority in position, weapons, ecjuip- 
ment, marksmanship, discipline, and drill; by proper contacts 
among the offlcars and between the officers and their men; and 


by the confidence of the troops In their chiefs. It is ralEed by 

If BtabiUEed lines are held close to enemy Uaes on more com- 
manding ground, so that the daOy losses of the troops exceed 
fhose of the enemy. A reputation for failure in a learier destroys 
morale. Tbe morale of a unit is that of its leader. It is not 
defeated until he is defeated. 

Leaders inspire confidence in their subordinates primarily by 
their ability to gain material advantages over the enemy with 
the least losses. The presence of a commander with the troops 
In action, as dteo as possible, is essential to morale. <> 

A eominimd« must: bear in mind the fact that his;|^^^^M 
etmdiUoai it tto baeilB '<o{ hfe efficienoyv It is his duty to the' men 
under his command to conserve his own fitness by proper regard 
for food and rest, particularly in times of crisis. Neglect of this 
rule soon renders him unable to brinp; a normal mind to the 
solution of his problems, and reacts unfavorably on his whole 

Combat preparation consists in developing efficiency, confi- 
donoe, and 6aortUnation in the use of the personnel and material; 
»>>diBcipllne wUt^ will ii^ure cohesion and control under the 
MD^I&g conditions of: laftarch, bivouatf^ and battie; ^ sense of 
respoiis&iUty that will cause each individual to appreciate the 
Density for Mi doing his ^iarticalar task; a atate of training 
tb&t will prevent officers and men from disdaining the use of 
cover out of mere bravado or a feeling of shame; and a knowl- 
edge of all aids and devices that will minimize battle losses. 

It is the duty of the commander to make full use of the apti- 
tudes and capabilities of his subordinate commanders. To this 
end nothing is more helpful than personal acquaintance. A divi- 
gi0B "OOmmander should know at least all his field officers by 
i^jiie and character. .3%« «{pa«pritioii^iappllee)y w^^ appropri^* 
ate[!modtfi««tioti8j t&'hiih^abd:low!6r «cH^^ 

8. ^Vim staff.— The commander of ^btlctrte unit is assisted by 
a general staff and by a special ^aff consisting of technical, 
administrativi;, and supplj' personnel. 

The fitafi' is an aid to comnuuid. Its purpose is to relieve the 
commander of details by pioviding the basic infomiatioa and 
technical advice by which he may arrive at his decisions; by 
deveLopIi^/^eae dedoiosis into adequate plans, translating plans 
iatQ ordera, and igPilndlDittiiig them to subordinate agencies; by 
insur^nfi£heei^s<tutiott: of these orders by constructiKce intBisetiaD 
and obej^aMm fpr the (xmunander; by. keeping the oQTBmimder 



bstornsBd of ever^rtbtng he ought to know; by anticipating future 
needs and draftbig tentative plaos to ns^et tiiwwiaud'by nqpplft* 
scenting the commander's «Sort8 to eeouro' luxity of susfSm 
throughout his command^ 

The staff has a duty, both to the commander and to subordinate 
commanders. A staff officer transmitting an order from his 
commander to a subordinate commander should, without dia» 
loyalty to his chief, place himself in the attitude, for the time 
being, of an aide or staff officer of the subordinate; and the 
sut)ordinate himself should regurd the staff officer as a member 
of Ms ciwu Staff f or the ffec|i8i(w< ' 

The general staff is a closely coordinated group of asisistanta 
to the ooinQUuader; Its dn^ee ar« to reader professaoUal aid and 
assistance to him; to prepare detailed instructions for the execu- 
tion of his plans and to supervise their execution; and to act as 
his agent in harmonizing and coordinating ttio plans, duties, and 
operations of the various units and services of the command. 

The chief of staff is the commander's principal adviser, assist- 
ant, and official representative. He aids the commander In su- 
pervisiiig and coordinating the command and sblipuldffliijgjr'IM' 
entice confidence. Be transniits the wiU of the <« mitt i »nd«r ; aiul^ 
Itahis iMkoe t^ifteuneedbilit^r. aets&i^^u^ Meim-pamm 
of supervision and ooordinati(«i ftom: the eommaadex adequate 
to Insure continuity of control. 

There arc four assistant chiefs of staff, whose duty is to relieve the 
comma nderofdctail. EachexeroiseSjUndereontrolof the chief of 
staff, supervision within the field of his activities, in the name of 
the commander, and solely with a view to unity of control. 

The personal aides of a general officer commanding a unit are 
a part of his staff, but are not included in the unit staff. Their 
duti«9 are prescribed Tsy the oommander himself. One or more 
Mdes i^oOTupaay him when hels abMoit from 1^ mmmmd p<»t 

fs their duty to keep the chief of Bt*ffl informed of teiwhei!Q»> 
abouts of the comittander, and of any important, 'd«^totis <tbat 
he makes while absent. With the approval of tiie oonmiander, 
aides may be used as assistants in the general or spedai st^ 

4. Tendency to expand. — In every headquarters there is a 
constant tendency to expand the functions of staff adminis- 
tration, multiply personnel, and accumulate records and office 
equipment. The commander must limit such ias^>aBilfm tQ as 
e^eni^al mluimuM and organlzehlaiUiladqaarte^imi^tlCitl^n' 

4 AMiJUTim mm comtuammmi^mmmam miiTB 

d, BmploTjnent of th» «tafl. — The commander must imder- 
stond the duties, powers, and limitations of his staff. He himself 
bfia'been selected for his task because of his high personal char- 
acter, firm will power, and professional ability. He must imbue 
bU staff with his ideas, hie desires, his etiorgy, a,nd his methods. 
Ab he gives to his staff, so will he receive. He should encourage 
its members, in their capacity as advisers, to speak with frack- 
DSBB^ He should make full use, after careful evaLuation, of the 
ad Vlte of the members of his gesieral and technical st^. He | 
■t^ufal inake them use their mlncb for him; but they merely ' 
furnish him with material, often oo&flicting, upon which he muet 
come to a decision, 

A staff is not a legislfttive body whose decisions are binding 
upon the commander. It is an advising body, whose counsel 
may Iso taken or left, or taken in part. Mauy of the greatest 
decisions in war have been made contrary to the advice of staffs; | 
and many happy decisions have come from suggestions of com- 
paratively junior staff oflScers. If a commander permits others 
to decide fear Mm, he abrogates bis fui)<!;^;i^;|iiiid c^^s to be a 
eommandetfi i «otimiaiider must bbaaeibl mAke all important 
dedaioilB. CommaAd'te his iKrerogativB. 

6. Bstimate of the situation. — In no othe* activity does 
action depend so much on prediction as to what an opponent may 
do, as in war. Time and movement are constantly changing tlie 
situation. Over-asHurance that they have divined the enemy's 
intentions is the besetting pitfall of commanders and staSa of 
higher uiuts. It is so easy to make facts fit a tbepr^^ tl^t they | 
are constantly Iq. danger, of overlooking the true significance otf 
the facts. t^EOpefeifc^uatioa .of facts is the most difficult task 
tbot ooAi^wts, a eot&mahder and his staff. They must be able 
tSD fit inforiftatfon, ai li comes In, to tiie i^poi^hesis which they 
have already formed; but they must feaye<itlie sqpeii-mindedjaess 
to recognize a contradictory fact, and the moral courage to 
cliangc tfieir hypothesis, if the new facts warrant it. 

Overestiniation of the enemy's strength dismays commanders 
and troops. The combat value of units fluctuates in battlei, which 
Is more an affair of morale than of material and numbers. In ev^ry 
hard-fought battle, demoralization eventually co]3a«s fp oae or I 
both stdss. An abto iKHcanander wil]kj|e.tec| it in. the enemy, .^hj^ w 
^cUAinse^res^ andtMa.ilibe'TictQT:^; ft^ji too soon invites 
(disaster; to wait.*too toj^ ew^oes the chance of victory. 
- 7. PreparattoniajfAdiUtiibutioQ f4 oidn^.-^W^m a com- 
mander has siBde Ub- 4$iMmM il^a^^mi^ila.ty?^^^ 

staff, with such instructions aus will leave no (loubt as to its mean- 
ing. The chief of staff is then responsible for the translation of 
this decision into such orders as will insure e.^iectition. The 
staff ceases to be, for the thne, an advising body, and becomes a 
working machine to otus^ OStt' the dedsloh of 'the eommmdcr in 
all its details, A ^giocd xibmsokdee does not burden himself wl^ 
Working tout of^derti^.' ' > 

Fpessure oBd sk^ ihust be used to issue orders quickly , Large 
imi#'6omihahdei'B should determine by practice the time required 
feMT ftrders to reach the lowest elements of their respective com- 
mands. It will vary with the weather, terrain, hour of the day or 
night, and particular situiif i^.nl^. Contnmiiders should make it 
their constant study to reduce this scale of time, and they should 
ever bear in mind that orders given in violation of this scale will 
miscarry in whole or in part. Subordinates' must -be. allowed 
the mecesst^ time to ma&e du^thcifar avmiatSen «dd fbuouHmtt 
t&Ste'to^Ower units, -■ : (■ - ■ i 

The time may be greatly shortened by the' coldsistent practice 
of gi%dng advance information to lower headquarters, in as full 
detail as circumstances permit, as soon as a dec is ion is reached or 
an order is received from higher headquarters, without waiting 
to translate such decision or order into detailed instructions. 
Thus warned, each lower unit In turn can make more deliberate 
and effective preparation. It must be remeii^t>e(ied, Ju^vsver, 
that warning orders increase the danger of leHki^i ' iGant^'must 
be obaarved WprenirvesecKioy, r.;^ -rr r> ; 

A. Stefl aiitttnBOe in op»istionsi—^T1ie commander aho^d 
diseuBs'f r^y irith his staff ofScers, from time to tiin^ the details 
of the orders which he gives for the conduct of an action, and 
should give them his views as fully as possible, stating the 
course to be pursued in all contingencies that may arise. He 
should send them to critical points to keep him promptly advised 
of what is taking place. In a great emergency, as when new dis- 
positions have to be made on the instant, or it becomes necessary 
to reinforce one oonuiiM^ by sending to Its aid troops Ictim 
.It&other, and ther^ is liot 'tium lio eommunieate with headquar- 
ters, the staff 'offit^r present idtoold e^lain the views of , his 
comm«ider to 'th^ eoramanders on the ground and urge imme- 
diate action without waiting for specific orders from the higher 
commander. The will of the commander when it is made known 
to the subordinate commander becomes an order to be carried 
out, not by the messenger who delivered It, but by the subordi- 
tmim commander trho reoelvee it. S^s^ fMcmt tun tid», net 

.6 aa^HQtta^isa 

■MQimanderB. No part of the power to command e^:H|d^ dele- 
l^ted to them. Tliey should be able to inform, but not to order, 
the local commander, whose responsibility for action is complete. 

9. Conferences with subordinates. — Orders are always 
subject to misinterpretation and miscomprehension. For a liirge 
opecration, written orders should always be supplemented by^oon- 
ferenoes of the group commander vi^ iamf commaiiders; of tfa« 
^gom^ Qo^daandcx wiidi ld8> ootrps «oinmaa(ic(rig $1 Hba, eox^ ecmi- 
tatiS^ilitiifltli bift dixdkkm' iMUsiij^deraj a&d:^f tiii^tUTision eom^ 
mander with htg subordinate oomxaanders. At these eonf ^lenoes, 
chiefs of staff and others concerned should be present. In calling 
conferences, commanders must be considerate of the timsj of sub- 
ordinates, and careful in selecting the place of assembly, since 
these subordinates, cacb in turn, will desire to call conferences of 
their own subordinate commanders. Such a conference is not a 
''oouncQ of war," but a meeting of the chief with his lieutenants 
for a thorough understanding of the plan and notifor tbe drifting 
of the {dan. Eaeh tftta&^n mufit be handled ig>on ' its 6wn 
imeiito. Subciidii^tw look to the dlteeting head to et&te the 
piirpdse to be thieved, so>tbat they may take effective measures 
to carry out what is expected of them. A common understanding 
among the higher commanders engaged in an operation is indis- 
pensable to success. The most cordial relations and thorough 
understanding should be maintained between neighboring com- 
manders and staffs. 

10. Execution of orders. — Orders must be carried out. The 
commander Is responsible for the execution of hia own orders. 
He is assisted by his stt^ officeiB, ^rho act in the capacity vS-lh- 
jpectorsL It is mosit difficult to get lower ' comihasdeora to think 
beycMtdf^ieir initial objectives. In the midSt of a great operation 
and afterwards, a numbness and torpor come over the partici- 
pants, which is manifested amongst the officers by a decliEir in 
initiative and a slowness in comprehending orders. The human 
and material world will conspire against the commander, and be 
will have no ally to sustain his own constancy. Campaigns and 
battles are inextricably associated with heat and cold, dust, 
taiilj mvul, gloomy (uid' <itoaourag^sient. When a commander 
hafi titade a deddton, he it^ttst' earry it out a^d jkUow no difficulty 
to stop him; His eteS must stand fitmly behind him to help 
Mm iheet Us difficulties. He must keep himself informed of tha 
progress of his units and overcome inertia and delay. He can 
liot shift reiponeibiiity for failure. . ,; ,i ;, , 

Jclc) jCOKlc 97.". I.f.^llt;... !|UJ>-. .}r r.->}'rt<n ftifw 1ll.-lliX/ttB14io .jfflC 

'Chaptbb 2 


1 1. EeadquarteMii — The headquarters of the field forces in a 
theater of war is a general headquarters. It cornea into coIb^ 
ence by onter of the President. r ,.• 

1 ilSv l^ cpmmaiadAt. in ftMet' — A icomntaaider in • cthlst 
r ^neitd^ cojitrol ovet a theater of war, trhtch may consist of ons 
I ormoremutally dependent theotesa of operations within easy com- 
municatlon with one another. He draws up and issues strate- 
gical plans in accordance with the general policies prescribed by 
the President. He specifies the personnel and supplies of all 
kinds required for his field forces, requests their allocationt and 
estabiishes policies and priorities for their distribution. 
He acts as army commander when there is a single army, and 
I as group eomroa^BTi Wh^ tjbeiie is a siitgle group, or he may 
assign tltBM ic£«ani^dft.>4o a&o^lte^-ieffiic^ wrt 
dmulbimetitiB]^ M the eommwa^ of a large unit and the 
oommander of one of its component units. 

13. Strategy. — Strategy is the especial province of the 
commander in chief. He designates the ends to be accomplished, 
allots the means, and assigns the tasks to subordinate com- 
manders. From him must come the plans and impulses that 
guide and animate all below liJm. It b be wbo suoee«ds^m 
fn,a campaign. 

The cominander in chief should know personal oharA(>- 
' tciristioa of the leaders of the opposing forces. Strategy should 
not be based alone upon geographical features and upon the 
strength and position of the opposing forces. No sound stra- 
tegical plan can be formed which ^ores the personality of 
enemy leaders. 

The commander In chief must foresee far in advance, and, from 
time to time, warn group and army commanders of his ultimate 
plans. WhUe present plans and orders are being carried into 
eSeel^ futwe projects must be foreshadowed, in ord^ ,th^ 
means may be aocui^^ulated and installatioDS objuiged to carsy 
them oat. C^atcEr foresight and preparation fffe required for a 
retreat tlian for an advance. A retreat should be a preparation 

I for a new offensive, not the culmination of disaster. The com- 
mander in chief should be one eampaigjn ahead in his preliminary 

, planning. He should take Into id» eonfldence the com^oas^en 



.fifiJSFf&filjftflSE aafl^efaiid of armies, from whom he should require 
preliminary BtadieBt and tent&tive plans. These studies and 
plans B,re inviiluiftile^f6 a '«e9Xi)fai(kMe(r in eMil & earning to his 

' 14. Ooncentration.. — The concentration of the armies is 
based upon: the strategic plan. The form of concentration 
depends upon how aoourately the subeequentstrategie tnaoeuver 
may be foreoaet. ^h^ thib i^tuatioii is definitely known, the 
concenttatfon is effected so that the forces may be launched ' 
without delay- against their objectives. When the situation is 
not clear enough to justify a definite scheme of maneuver, 
general headquarters prepares a plan of concentration which 
will bring the forces into the concentration areas so disposed 
laid grouped as to meet unforeseen enemy action, '■<{'; 

16. Taotleo, — The commander in chief is the master taGiieiia>v I 
To adapt ntea^- to jendfi, to determine f ormationB. and procedure ' 
fof oSense ^tmM <defiit»^ and to prescribe the special training i 
ilieiCestM:^ 'to^'teii^le 1ibe<''t3'^^ counter and overcome all 
«ribstaeles, are, next to ' strategy, the highest functions of the I 
Commander in chief. Subordinate commanders make tactical ' 
plans and carry them into execution. 

16. Personal contact.. — It is not sufficient to publish tactics, 
doctrines in orders, Tlie true spirit must be conveyed by per- 
sonal contact and persuasion. The commander in chief should 
ilbdow his group, army, corps, and even divisioii commanders so | 
weU that he can foretell what they will do under given circum- 
Mftt^. Eaeli conMiaader shbtild; llf tixm, be iipon Wi» devest ' 
'ta^esaig:- with his subordinate comnumdeKs. He^ abould knofS^ tbe 
KEfiot capacity of every one of these subordinates »hd just Where 
td'°p1ace him to get from him his best service. By persona! 
contact, down through the commanders of large units, the 
doctrines of the commander in chief must percolate. 

17. Reserves. — The reserves at the disposal of a commander 
in chief consist of the general headquarters r^rve and, in addi- 
ttoo, such corps and divisions as may be held In strategical 
teserve; The gener:il headqui^ten reserve is a reservoir of 
ttoo]^ from^ whieh to reiufo^ subc>rdinate units. Xt consists 
eseeniially of tanks, artOI^, aviation j chemical troops, and 
engineers. Its strength and 6bmp0)^ti&n de^^nd uped'clxonm- 
stances. The commander in chibf allots units to groups of armies 
and to armies, or to the eommuiiications zone, as the situation 
demands. He uses his strategical reserve to influence tlie situ- 

ation by maneuver or combat, or to reinforce those large unite 
whose mission is of greatest importance or whose rituatioa is 

18. Personnel of general headquarters.— A general hwtd- 
quarters operating in the home country or in contiguous territory 
is small in personnel. When it is operating beyond the sea, it 
is necessarily large, for it will then have to perform many of the 
duties wliioh at home are performed by the War Department. 
At home) procutement of supplies is a functtou of the War 
Deparianeni; abroad, it may be largely in; .^< l^uida of 
commfucider in chief. ' 

19. Supplies. — Whether in friendly or in enemy territory, 
the theater of operations must be drawn upon to the limit of its 
capacity for the supply of the military forces. Such utilization 
of local supplies should be carried out under a systematic and 
well-formulated plan with due regard to the needs of the local 
population. Just payments will be made to secure the active 
cooperation of inhabltantfl' and encotuuge: eontisased pro^OffUon 


80. ilie tTainilng &t iBXgH units. — The object of the tnuning 
<^ large units is to combine and coordinate the combat training 
of all the arms and services so as to develop in the larger units 
the cohesion and teamwork essential to efficient action. 

The training of units larger than the division is essentially the 
training of cominanders, staffs, and heads of services. It 
includes various kinds of exercises, either on the map or on the 
ground. Exercises may b« tswried on with or without troops. 
In time of peace, tactical Instruction with troops actually present 
usually ceases with th» diidsion, the larfjest unit which it is 
practicable to assemble- Fqr units larger than the division, 
tactical instruction is usually carried on by lectures, map prob- 
lems, and by command and staS exercises. But when troops and 
ground are available, field maneuvers should l>e held for the 
simultaneous instruction of officers and troops in the units above 
a division. In all exercises, the superior unit commander controls 
itmd directs the exercises; commanders of units participating in 
the exercises command their units. Map and ground exercises, 
efpeciaUy apfdicable to tracing lai^ unite, a^e classified aa map 



inaxieuv^, tinit' eomunaud poet «xesrcisee< ' . 

21. Uethodfl «f action. — The offen»ve in«ui9 action to seek 
out aad defeat the enemy; It impliea advance and attack. 

The defensive differs from the offensive in that tlie defender 
awaits the first blow, while the attacker gives it. Once engaged, 
both sides may use ativuin'e and attack. The power of the de- 
feiisive lies in position, in opportune action, in BkUl in counter- 
Rttack. A lai^ proportion of the deci^^ive battlei of bietory has 
been- gained through the skillful ub^ of the oqURterattaok and 
the counteroSensive by numerically inferira: taxees is defensive 
battles. Id defeaoee, b^her commanders must have tesetvt& 
kept well in hand to meet unforeseen emergencies and for counter- 
offetisive action. In offense and in counteroffense Ihoy should 
not hesitate to use their last reserve. In the olfeiisive, the 
comniander must focus his attention upon the objectively in the 
defensive, upon the point of greatest danger. X 

©ver the grater part of fronts in contact, during the greater 
part of the time, both sides are on the defensive. In war the 
mental attitude is habitu^l^ iiuni vt oSense; but the physical 
attitude is habitually that of defense. Offensive action is occa- 
sional, fat 'biiel intervals Of time. StlCceSiB c6tti6s from thia ablUty 
of the commander to select the right time and .the right place for 
offensive action. 

22. Offense. — As long as the enemy is capable of offering n 
coordinated resistance, the attack itKclf sliould be a step-by-step 
forward movement from one good position to another. It is the 
duty of all commanders to exploit their successes to the utmost. 
A commander must see that his units do not get out of hand. 
He must send reinforcements through the breach, rattier thau 
check the advance of units where the going is easy. Troops 
generally do best when they are launched in .an attack with dis- 
tant objectives anS are held continuously to their task until their 
offensive power is exhausted. When they have reached this con- 
dition, fresh troops should be at hand to give a new impetus to 
the offensive. When flanks can be reached, a skillful coinmainier 
will maneuver the enemy out of his chosen position and attack 
him at a disadvantage. 

The enemy's forward positions will usuall^^^ teund on high 
ground. In approaching these positions, ufe' imfensive spirit 
prompts men, to the^f own disadyivitage^ '^^^ to the 
enemy, and thus to occupy low, 'iikid emi irWloiipy t^ona 
completely dodxtbii^ 1^ high igp>ili|d within f^e: i^EtfefuUy 


selected lines of an enemy on the defensive. The attackOTs push 
forward and occupy positions on the downward'^QF^B^j^toniiHi^' 
bim enemy, where their commutticatioaB ore e^oseii; tmA •whsa^ 
there axe few places for the installation: of their guns and amBtu* 
nition dumps without th^ presence beiog jeadly< detected. The 
objectives to be sought should be oommandlng poalttons held by 
the enemy or within the enemy's lines. A strong defensive posi- 
tion held by the enemy is not often a good defensive position for 
troops operating frontally ajtainst it. The offensive may be 
quickly followed by the enemy's counteroffensive. To meet this 
counteroffensive, quick reorganization on good defensive posi- 
tions is necessary. When, for any reasoui the advance stopsi the 
commander shei^ immediately aolaoipate a counteroffensive hy 
reorganizing his troops for'defeiise^.BTUt though- he espetrtfl soqat 
to cohthiue the offensive; ist pass ' ta a new offenebve. 

When the enemy becomes so disorganized as to be unable to 
offer further coordinated resistance, the commander accelerates 
progress by the assignment of zones and directions of advance, 
md by releasing to .'subordinate units the means necessary for 
their immediate reinforcement. 

Forces that contemplate the offensive are careless and negligent 
Ul their organization for defense. Measures must be taken 
(lEiy commandeiB :io counteract this natural tendency, . liloi man's 
land should be an area between two good po^ons-; : ilf tt^ enemy 
chooses ' to :i&t^ike hfe' e^ed positioni «ul come foriif ardi he will 
place himiself at a great' disadvant^e and incur greater losses 
than he will inflict. The relinquishment of bad ground lor (food, 
in selecting lines of defense, must not be influenced by .seutiment 
against giving up any ground whatsoever to the enemy. 

23. Defense. — It should be the aim of the commander ot a 
defensive force to compel his adversary to attack him in a strong 
position wliere a repulse is reasonably sure. The elements of a 
good system of defense are anoo^oot zone with a good defensive 
line; an organized battle position, at such ii, distance from the 
front line as to escape most of the enemy's preparation fire; an^ 
positions which may serve as a base of departure for counter- 
attacks to restore the integrity of the battle position. The mai? 
defense is made, generally, on the main line of resistance of the 
battle position, at such a distance in rear that the enemy's light 
artillery can not lire effectively upon it from the same position 
from which it fires upon the outpost position, By this method, 
th^ ^emy's assaults, his main blowst are absorbed: ins ovsi^COinin^ 


bhe resistance of small detachments. In the outpost position there 
must be alert troopis cApat^'ol^'gtVtaj; nrafiilhg and of retarding 
tend bj>«ytiBg up'the movesj^iaste ^ < eniiemy . Defense on the 
ba$tl0 ^tit^tiSttHtti^ 'cduat^ieitejae^ tk!£ thei ^ropcir momeBt are 
moat ^eifitiv<g>meana <iti AkSmiteg -A ']^weii^t#te«ft. But this 
procedure Should riot be made an iti variable 6r 'riven a g^rteral 
rule. It should be varied by the most obstinate (iefetise of the 
outpost zone. Commanders must know the; enemy and be able 
to play upon his chfiracteriKtios. Troops tliat slioot- well and lire 
supported by good artillery are capable of an effective defense 
(jJ^atby we 11 -selects; d position. 

' "An Kctive defense should be condue^ted with' the minimum of 
fe^^e«»f «aitlw£'t^'>oammaud) May pis^ <the^«ftejltslv4 :wttb the 
jtu^ckiM^ '6f''^[i«iaBiK!> while an 

action is going on. The eoffibat must be surtaiiled by troops 
already in line, in order that adequate! reserveB iMy be built up 
and maintained. Freah troops should be held in reserve, ready 
for counterattack, or to go into action where oircumstances abso- 
lutely require them to do so. Battles are gained by the use of 

Withdrawals and retirement should be from one defeneive 
'pt^^oa to another. It ia far better to fall bade far enough to 
get good ground than to retain ^aAtti^»ts^)lBt>gsismidi oloee 46 
a strong pdiition 6f'the eneai^. " "" > ' ' ' ■ f ••" 

The commander's controlling motive in every retrograde move- 
ment, must be to retain his Uberty of action by preserving his line 
of commuTii cations. Above all, he must avoid bein.K lK;,sioi;ed. 
The coniKiatider wl\o gives up his line of communications and 
svi limits to a siege invites disaster To preserve his liberty of 
action, he may find it necessary to sacrifice detachments by re- 
quln&g thetn to hold certain places at all (Kwta; but he must keep 
bis command, 'as' a whole, free to maneuvffii with a view to its 
eventual kitnploynietltm' IM offensive: A itition'a capita) and 
ihaity of its important elties may fall; but, if itiKfonsM remahiin 
^e 0eld, they may be victorious in the end. 
' 34. 'Terrain features.— In eeleoting areas for offensive opera- 
tions, a commander should ohocNse open, gently rolling ground, 
which will afford some concealment to advancing troops and per- 
mit the easiest and most effective support of fire from all types 
of weapons. He should avoid large woods and villages, which 
eonstitute e^<t^ent supporting ppjjit« for the defense and afford 
iBoneealiDoifiai^'dceoi bo^ g^wniii esodi «elrN^>iabsra^i«stion'.^^^^ He 
fliiffifl!d,^0s»si a iwlOB vimi; «^i«tt ^i^^^l|g|SSlife(Bil^ 


his front, as they ionn larorabie toutea for- penetratiOB or ad- 
vanoe. The mutual'iidQia^>ii9^ tJleoppodfeafepda <m«aeh Hf^ter 
itaidthe^lft^ otf l^tK>nuai^#te^aui;aauuiU{^pa|»^ 
p3^nj»flivaliey, used as ait^^tbiolhad'i^li^iiG&iCfteB^ &sls>Uf witliin 
the aone of a single lai^ unit. Vmi^^SiaM^Kieani^ia^ should 
choose terrain where the large valleys dr ravines 'run "parallel to 
his front, as the ridges fortn natural lines of resistance. The 
streams parallel to his front are the most effective obstacles to the 
attaek of tanks or other mechanized forces. 

Chaptm 4 . , , , ' 


25. Unity pf , Q.o,i»Miatid. — To. ,^(^i|re,ii?utj;. of .command, two 
or more armift^ .(jpeEating upon. ^il^,,eaine;',if*CM^ P'^^^ 
under a higher commander, the army group oonamender. ^ 
of command, decentralization of .operation, and coordin^t^o]^.|^ 
effort are his guiding principles. The commander. in chief pf 
forces in the field acts as group commander, when the number of 
armies is email; but, when the number of armies is so large as to 
render difficult direct control by G. H. Q,, two or more groups 
must be formed. The commander of each group directs tbjfi 
,pj)erations of his group under the instructions of G. H. Q. 

tj^ft.OT more armies on contiguous fronts are engaged in 
,a joint operation, either of attack or, defense, they should be 
placed in the same group, for the period of the operation. If a 
serious situation j^^^^c^j^^-i j^^junction of two groups of 
armies, unity of coByp^^^j^jfipe^pr^ a regfoujRii}g,.po 

that one group Cf^^lffluw^^ss' wflt'H'^f^qijOjp^^^M^jJ^ 
front. ' ' ^ 

For a specific operation or to meet a great emergency, the conj- 
mander in chief may desire to make a regroupiug of certain 
armies under his own direct and temporary control. When he 
dkies, he should do it frankly. It is far better, if a suitable officer 
pf adequate rank is available, to assign him to such a command. 

36, Troops and duties. — The group commander has pp 
group troops, but lai^e reserves may be placed at his disposal fo^ 
,j^^lftleular operations. In aooordanee with missions assigned to 
bim by G. H. Q,, the group oouimander draws up tactical plans, 
issues orders to armies, special troops, and reeervea under his 
command, apportions to the armies the forces at his disposal, 
aQots a ones of action or sectors to thi' armies, and coordinates 
their movements and efforts. He assigns tasks to his armies, 

14 A. manujU/ fob command ebs of labqe units 

{$Si^saMm>aeciA>mi i^>r6araita#sea'rof'!£betiBerviceB, and only such 
ifMSiJ^jd and material as will enstble Ws headquartera to operate. 
If li^Efetegroup of armies is a tactical unit. Tiie commander exer- 
idsW 'territorial responsibilities and has supply, administrative, 
-BrieUi btrategical functions only when his headfiuarters is the head- 
quarters of a theater of operations. He assures the cooperation of 
annies, coordinates their efforts, and distributes the means that 
hftve beea allotted to Mm by bi|^er^uthority. The f unctione erf 
the army gioup b«»3q|uaT^ezitfof ^ ftnamy headquarters, when 
acting aa hsadiif^fi^^i pi i]^rt3j|||^{9e^{f^, are dis«uaaed in 
Chapters. J 
' The group head(jti^:li|l^^iie^jjr ^ifli^l directly the' ^^nt air 
reconnaissance or it may assign tMi t'econnaissance to the armies. 
Distant cavalry reconnaissance by several cavalry divisions under 
one commander is also conducted under the direct control of the 
t;roup of armies. ' ' 

27. Oflenae. — On the oftensivej, the group commander assigns 
to each army a direction of ajd^!^^'^^ a zone of action, and an 
objective or successive ffiants. THroughout the march toiit^rd 
the enemy, i^e establishment of eohtact and eagagement'^kiid 
the actual attack, the army group commander requires each 
army to maintain its direction and to preserve contact with the 
riniiics on its flanks. During the approach marches, he estab* 
lishcs the alignment of tlie armies in the fjroirp by timely march 
directives, .\fter he has made contact with the enemy and has 
decided on the plan of attack, the army group commander apfpoT' 
^ttbi^ his troops itj'i^'^'#^^fe^:v^''^6^i^'itt>^^'%lehy^^i^ 
blow. He must at all times foresee the possible extension or 
contraction of bis command and zone of actibh. and lidust have 
"^j^toa^^pareii for these contingencies. 

^ ' tbefease.— On the drfendve, the group commander assigns 
'^^ors to the armies and indicates the general nature of the 
(ifefense, and the conditions under which withdraual may be 
ofTeetrd or a coiinteroffonsive begun. On both the oirmisive and 
the defensive, lie prescribes the limit and nature of air recon- 
naissance, when distant air reeonnaissance is conduc^^^'^y ~&e 
armies. When the group controls distant air recon'neissance, 
he designates the line to '^hlch the armies fixe responsible for 
thw* iujf t«^miai8«aacei To ostfry out tactical and strategioai 
plkhs; tIw;'sJraiy' :|ii^i$ cdinmanifer aaaigns missions and appor- 


tions teoops to tus armies ^' and 'COoedfat&teB theix efforts ) and 
mo^^ents On t&e defeosive,. Ae m&y^ifeilm &.icvmrie Ih kat^ 
^ itwo ways. Either he: may fdaoe on army in second line-to 
meet a possible movement of the enemy against aflank,or hemaj 
take forces from various areas in the (heater of operations. lie 
plans well in advance for the employment of those reserve.'j ;tnd 
places them wliere he can use tliein (o carry out his plan of action, 
29. Forming now armies. — The group of armies is generally 
disposed with armies abreast. Occasionally i the tactical situa- 
tion may favor the placing of an army in Beeoiid UnOi either in 
fe$x of an expo^ flasdc :qr bcAilad a long oontiiiaoits frtrnti If 
the situation indie^tes the probable tic«d c|!affl addti£o&al^«^^ 
in front Ihie ior! ln-,fltt»te#; te^serrei the' ^Inmander In bM^ 
assigns a comiiilii^p^tajaS'^makes available to him suitable per- 
sonnel for the atitf Bind service heads at his headquarters. When 
occasioEi arises to employ the army, it is created by adding thv 
necessary troops and services to this nucleus. 

Ch.\pter S 
, THE, ARMY .... 

aKTiON I. OetjMal... 

H. TliB army In DdBwi^lfi bitaeL. 
m. XliB army In «l«fftiiiiTe Mttiii.. 

SacTioN I 
/ , , QENEBiAL . 

30. Organization and functions. — The army is the largest 
self-contained unit. It consists of a commander with a staff, 
specialized artny troops and services, and two or more army 
corps. To- these may be add off a special assignment of G. H, Q. 
aviation, G. H. Q. reserve artillery, cavalry divisions, and other 
auxiliary troops, varying in number and composition according 
to the task assigned. The army may act independently or "tt 
may form a part of a group of armies The army commander'^ 
relations with hie subordinates have many ramiflcations, Theaa' 
subordinates should be a band of brothers with a mutual under, 
standing. It depends upon th'e coinmander to make them so. 

The army is the fundamental unit of strategical mauettver If 
has terri tonal,, tactical, administrative, and supply functions. ' 

#0 «-iie^npi#^nQ9i)aE^p^HM^ 

31. The adcmy efltmrnander. — The army nunmsxidw plans i 
and cftnies out the broadsE phases of tactical opcrfttions neces' { 
8a ry to execute the strategical misf,i(iii assigued him by the 
comma Dder in chief. He initiates opt rid ions by giving orders 
■to. the commanders of corps and other lai'gc unitt; (iiioctly under ' 
lib, coimuand and to the chiefs of army services. The army 
jDonunander draws : up t&ctioAk'and adminietrative plans for the 
employment of the armjr^ ti^detr instructioat: {tom>hii^er au- 
tiiQilty; he ibGueBJonli^ tO 'tfae corps and othesr'titifter''usder his 
eoatrol; he aUots' divisions and special troops to the 'Coi^> baaed 
tai the tactical and administrative plans; md he coordinates 
the efforts of the corps and of the army troops,'i>i': 

When a geaeral engagement has begun, the array commaiider 
may influence it by the use of his tanks and his air forces, by iiis 
jSOntrol of the army artillery, by his power of coordinating the 
aftiUecy of tt^ioorps^ and by the use of Ills re.'ierves. He retains 
direct control of engineer, medical, and other administrative 
and supply troops, or allots them to ootpB and divlsioina a« the 
situation demauds. 

, 3S. Tanks. — The army tank commander pr^soribes, under the 
direction of the army conMander, tiie disMbution of tank unite 
to the odrps, and exercises command of those retained under army 
control lie iillots 1jo;\vv tanks to Corps, tf|lt,)»e may hold some 
tanks in Ihc aruu" reserve for use in the later phases of the action. 

33. Aviation, — Till' ;iniiy (-oramander ordinarily controls 
combat aviation assigned or attached to the army. He attaches 
ad|PMicM3a!c(^;li#^ to the coi-ps .-is the iSituation requires. Attack 
jkv^tlon shotitd be concentrated and used against eneo^ troops 
In the same manner as mii^t^»isji<Bi and artillery. The army 
chief of ayiatioQ commands all air units under army control, and 
toordinates, under the direction of the army commander, their 
action with one another and with the air units of tiic corps. lie 
attends, in particular, to distant reconnaissance and to the eon 
ceatration of the air forces for important missions. 

34. Artillery, — The army commander determines whether 
there will bo an artillery preparation and its kind He takes into 
consideration the question of tactical surprise, knowledge of the 
enemy's defensive organisation, and the ammunition supply. He 
controls harassing and Interdiction Sre. He determines the 
length of the general counterprepar&tion fire and the times when 
it shall be flred. The army chief of artillery directs, for the army 
ootmnandei, the oUotment of army and G.,H. Q. rosea' y,^ arttiHery 

corps with each other and with the army artillery. He exercises 
command of artillery kept under arriy controL OrdinarS^ 
mttny coatrols the 'heavier callbeTs . of &rtil\ery and assfgm^ttte 
of the ortHie^ to corps, i ^ i' Sto 

35. Beaerves.-^The army ordinarily hol^ one more divi- 
sions in the army reserve. It may send the' artillery of reserv* 
divisions to reinforce the divisions in line. On the offensive, 
corps are not held in army reserve, but (heir entry into line may 
be delayed to meet the dcvelopnient of the tactical plan. A 
menace of a( tack often exercises a more decisive itiiluence than 

attack itself In a passive defense the corps are tiaualij'' 
ipl&eed abreast. m <■ 

In an active defense, where the army conimander contempiatitt 
a generaii cotmt6roSeiiMv%vife4Ba7>|»e^»$i»n)^^ to hold a 
corps or a number of dlvtstlEKtMdtt T'M<kKe;t'''iEfe of^ete a general 
eounteroffensive only in- accordance with plans from higher 
authority. Subordinate commanders order counterattacks at 
the earliest practicable time, freneially, in accordance with pre- 
viously prepared plans, wherever favorable opportunities for 
flaeh 0outiter&ttacks may be foreseen ' '■ 


. ■ 'erf 

36. The march to battle. — The^iaartyt^omiaander reoetvee 
from higher authority a general directlb'n ctf' advance. To keep 
the army constantly on this direction, lie assigns directions of 
advance and zones of action to the corps. If, during the opera 
tion, certain corps are diverted from their assigned axes, he brings 
tbem back gradually or adopts other suitable measures j suob 
Inserting on the front a seoond-lihe corps, to toi^teiti %he m{ttti 
of the army on its general dljrectionk * 

Duiing the advance otn f^e-enemjr, the army liominBiider naiiil^ 
place all of his corps abreast or he iaaf place one or more oorps 
to the second line. He may hold out separate divfalons of otbSt' 
units for the second line or to form a reserve for the army. The 
formation will depend upon the strategic maneuver which the 
commander in chief expects to execute after contact in made with 
t! 1 e n (.• 1 ny . Co rps a b rea st f ac i 1 1 tate entry into actio n to the f ro nt. 
Coi'iis ill column facilitate entry into action to the flank. TWt 
army commander assigns, to the reserve divislona and to anfi^ 
troops, positions in the march fonantton to f^usUitate their ^rcH^ 
ablft fut)ue'fmplo|aQaeBifei.ui$ iiouiint.ji '•.<i>ii i i-tju .i ;r.''.-^t:t,,l Vi 

34^t " Cavalry. — o. The modern fire power of cavahy, com- 
I'^i^^^ed -with its mobility, provides thi army dsmm&nder -wllj)^ , 
a ^j^94S.&iobUe. combat element for strategical and tactical-^ . 
liiissiona. Botii horsed and mecbanized cavalry assigned to 
an army "irill usually be retained under army control for «»- 
ployment on army misslonE, but portions of either or both 
may be attached to subordinate units when necessary. 

t). Cavalry should be aEsigned definite missions and, as the 
amount available will usually be limited, care must be taken 
that its strength is not expended on nonessential missions. 
Prior tp fxm\mtt cttrplxy is employed on reconnaissance, 
cqiimterE<«oiuiatj»Wtio« or ffscuritjr mlssicHas, or to 8««ure ad- 
vanced poaitiena. St^oitr eombat it is used to str^e ih« 
enemy in flanks or r«ar or as a mobile renerve and l&t^ to 
pursue the enemy or to oover a withdrawal. The selfictlon 
of hoj-sed or inechaiuKed cavalry or their joint use for par- 
ticular missions must depend on the situation. 

[A. G. 062.11 {3-10-^4}.] {UW5.) 

corps or a numlierof divunona in reserve. iSe ord«i8 a geneHff 
ODunteroSensive 'Old; in' adeordance vfitbii 'JciAm>'^/em "i^^gm 
authority. Subc^idiaate gommandere order cotutteiAtoieiu 
Uie e&ritest l^actjoablB ^me^ ^Deiiai^f In aeooi^^ilice with'pite^ 
viously prepared plans^ wberevi^ ts,*ottX^'Vppeiisa^l^>'t» 
such oounterattstdut may be foretoen ■ i^'vii .if jkC w,''!"! 

S»01!I0M U 

' THE Mfmfsm' if^mE" 

36. The march to battle.— The array commander receives 
itom higher authority a geneml direction of advance. To kee|i 
the' army constadtly on 1&n(<^setionr he assigns diraotitiMit'^it 
stdvanoe and sone» «f aetieaitto tise eorps. "Bidudng tiis'4]¥wi&' 
41on , certain corps are divitrted'£H>m their asrigned axes, he briii@i 
them back gradually oro^^ btheitisrtiitable measures , such a& 
inserting on the front a second-line corps, to maintain the mass 
of the iinny mi its t^ciuhral ilirwtioii. 

Durinjt the advance on Uie enemy, the army commander may 
place all of his corps abreast or he may place one or more corps 
in the second line. Be may hold out separate divisions or other 
unitSt&XT' '&e second tine or to form a reserve for the ^army . 1%e 
' li^aMon will' depend upon, the «tmt^^ taum^ver 
' oonutnaader bt cM«{ ezpbete toezwiiteafter^edirtstft ti: mide HWk 
the ene my . GorpB abreast facilitate entry intc» ao^n 1»4l^%^<&jiill 
Corps in column facilitate entry into action to tfae~ flai^'. The 
army commander assigns, to the rt:scrve divlsiims and to army 
trop^pe, positions in the march formation to facilitate their prob- 


37. Dispositions. — At » distance from the- enemy, the amy 
oommantier may dispo^o It is army widely and deeply. Such a 
disposition is best adn]:itt;d lo changes in direction, to enveloping 
maneuver, and to fhiiik pro (ec( ion, and permits the (ull use of the 
road and railway nets and of the camping and billeting facilities 
in the army zone of fteMon . Tbe dlspoaition will generally in vol ve 
plaeilig in front line one or more oorpB and in second line other 
coips with «irmy troops to be Used as: reserreu or td take a special 
part in the operation. Where the wmy. Is fl&nk army or is 
acting alone, the disposition should be such as to permit an exten- 
sion of the front and protection of the exposed flanks. The 
initial disposition of the army shouk! conform to the projected 

As the army approaches the enemy, it must increase its prepara- 
tion for action. With only such as the distance from the 
eO^Sf justifies, the aaaa^ eomtb&ad&t must {>lace the elem^ts of 
^.'.Q^stHnand so that ibe «a& ^M^ifaem reaidi^ in a combiiMd 
operation. He must gi ve to the magA ad vahced mnitft tiilMlons to 
secure the armj; until its deployment la coanpl^tei.' ' <.to<ti>e distance 
from the enemy decreases, the oommandec costratetg'hiAdisposi- 
tioiis, especially in depth, so that the more distant units may 
enter the neiian promptly. When battle appears imminent, he 
mo VPS lii^ army so as to secure for it the choice of the field of 

VI 3P> . Bs.tiibUsliiaeivt of i>oiiitaet.^By suitable use of his avia- 
0m't/S3i^$^tkg'i}iiiR'aam»fr^ atrivea to foresee where 

JMi wUl oteei tibO;j«HHV#jaiiiiiinF|uitit.hf[>si^ batUev Tbe^nn; 
Observation avte1A6ii «oitduD(bl "distaut^ reooffina&sBince.' The 
cavalry, operating nearer to the main bodies, completes the 
reconnaissance of the aviation, determines the genera! outline of 
the enemy's forces, and maintains coiiinct with them. The 
army commander directs tliu air coiohiit against the enemy air 
forces. I'roni thi; first coniai.'t-. the army pursuit units seek to 
secure freedom of action for our own aviation and neutralize 
that of the enemy. 
Qontact; is established piogres^vely. The cavalry determines 
general oiit^e ^ the «B^y> It seeks ito contact Car enough 
to the front to aUow the army to deploy properly for battle. 
The distance should be such as to provide at least two days for 
sucls deployment. To perform t his mission, the cavalry is some- 
times reinforced by detttchiiients of all arms. The contact made 
by the cavalry is more solidly established by the adv^iiice guards 
of front-line corps. These ad^traiice guards first support and then 



relieve the cavalry. They drive in the resistance whicli the 
cavalry has been unable to overcome or stop the ad v. weed enemy 
elements not held up by the cavalry. If the enemy is in p^tlijOj 
contact is fully estaljlished when the line is determined upo^^ji^^^ 
the enemy is oSering a solidly organized resistance. If the epemy 
is in motion, contact is established not only by determining the 
front on which these foTces are moving, but also try directing and 
maintaining elements agfiinst that front, to form a protective line 
behind which the main bodies can make their dispositions for 

89. Frontages. — The depth to which an offensive can pene- 
trate varies directly with the frontage on which an adequate 
offensive can be launched. The army commander, tiierefore, 
determines the initial frontage of attack necessary to attain 
the objectives. He divides the front of attack- SJnong his corps 
and assigns to each corps its mission,, .Aa.^;^|B|qc|^ rule, he .will 
assign to corps narrower frontages wb!eire,lN!^'.^^ to b«.excjr^d 
is greater. They can then push their effort to greater depths. 
If the front of the advancing elements narrows, the range of 
artillery permits the enemy to effect heavy eoueenUMtionn under 
which the attack weakens and may halt. The army commander, 
therefore, provides for reinforcements and lateral actions to 
maintain the front of attack of the army at le.^st equal to the 
froniap' of departure. 

40. Engaging the enemy,— Engaging the enemy forma t|j|9 
first phase of the battle. During the estabUshmeij.t of costsc^ 
the commanders of corps in the front line reinforce >their advance 
guardsr They now take control of the fight in their respective 
tones of action, and direct the deployment of their corps. They 
bring the action of first-line divisions to bear on selected localities 
or along the whole corps front. If this action does not suffice 
to overcome local enemy resistance, it should furnish definite 
information of the enemy dispositions and permit the formation 
of a solid front on which the army may deploy. OA^(jtelgy|ed 
front, where opposing forces are in contact, it may aj ^^m ^ft|-'frff 
necessary to undertake preliminary pper^tions: to. improve t^e 
conditions under which the attack is to be launched. The army 
wmmauder personally follows the action of the corps, and from 
the begiiming prescril>es tbe points whose possession is necessary 
for the deployment of the army. When necessary, he uses the 
army artillery. 

41. Conduct of the attack, — Establistiing contact and 
engaging the enemy permit the army commander to decide on 


his plan of action and complete the deployment of his army. 
Acting on intonnation received, he has reinfurt>(;rl ccrlaiij first- 
line eorpa. He next arrangi-s for the employment of his artillery. 
He places at the disposal of corps commanders part of his reserve 
of artillery andf iwrign* miseions to the »iiiy artillery. He then 
com|>lete8 b#'df^«^ion^. H^ &Biirt6 th fbe first line, corps 
heretofore fUsecohdllne, and, after weighing the requftnements ot 
sedoiid-Iine eteihenta, coniplctes the reiiiforcirig of eofrps. He 
preacrihes the positions of the army reserves. He supervisee the 
management of the army rear area, arranges for the operation of 
the vjiriijup services, and has ammunition and the necessary 
material lirought forward. Tlie army commander takes the fore- 
going measures to insure the prompt employment of the entire 
power of the army. He seeks to organize an attack which he 
will pqah with all the power at his disposal In a direfStion where 
8u(H!>is$ t!a!£t^«i^'d'i^c^'^ reirul'ts, 

-' liilg%Ctk^^^ To obtaiii eurprise, eeoirecy 

of^^)p#^Sti'ifc'-e49e*itialJ ' A short artillery preparation, of, if > 
the fittabkfer is sthing' in artillery, tonka, and aviation, its omis- ' 
3ion altogether helps to insure secrecy. The attack should ahvayp 
ije launched under the protection of the entire artillery, whose 
fire should be extended and supplemented by b(jnii)ardment and 
attack aviation available and by reserve machine guns In its 
advance, the infantry, preceded by tanks and smoke, endeavors 
to overcome the successive eoena^ lines of resistance, disrupt his 
dfi^nsive or^ttization in a mthhxttnn of time, and dleorgaTiize 
tUs aHfflei^ bj'Bfem. 'T^jie furlher thte iMiraiiKiC) 16 piishtidi the 
gf^ater are the dfffleuItieS to be overcome by the fighting units. 
Communication is more difficult, and iivim play among the differ- 
ent arms is less close. It is then that (he initiative of subordinate 
commanders, properly informed in advance of {he general plan 
and determined to carry out their mission, will find full field of 

The cornmaiideT may make other attacks on the front. They 
lorm part of the structure of the main attack and support it. 
No distinction in eiecotioii is made between these diffefrent 
attscltfi They must' all be pushed to a finish without thought I 

of alignment with one another. They differ only in the strength 
of the force.'i employed and in the extent of front assigned to each. 
Each element must penetrate independently and, by overcoming 
resistance in its front, help neighboring units to advance. When 
the battle is protracted, the army commander may find it neCes- 1 

sary to organize severai important attacks to be launched 
successively on different parts of the front. 

4S. Commander's influence, — Throughout the battle the 
airmy oonunander must funiish Impetus to the attack.; He 
usep Mi£ smu artillery tO'mtend^ the ;iii>tton:'afutt« corps^^i^ 
division artlUcsry; be employs his attached a£l»e]LaiHl/biCMiabitoS- 
ment aviation; and^ fiually, aEEd'«t>ove all, herbrii^ intef^layrliia 
reserve. He advances his reserves in "time' tO' ose tiiem in tbe 
area in which he seeks decisive results. As tie sends in reaervee, 
he endeavors tu form other reserves. But he should aot-hesitsste 
to throw into the battle his last reserves to gain a victory; ■ 

Tiius the army commander himself conducts the battle, by con- 
stantly assuring coordinaiion of the efi'orta of his subordinates 
whom he has already ixtformed of the general plan. H&^vea to 
the operation that unity direction, so indii^nsable'tg^b^iioesa. 
and he UDptesees his owni.dtiteirmii)atioai-~ aiic'i^i«iecuticiia:..^'viiiu) 

attack^ has beeh> strongly 'fortified and organized for defeotai, 
the attack meets difficulties which require special measures. In 
establi.shin(j contact, the advance guards act prnilently to avoid 
a premature cngagenietit of the nuiin bnuy. The advance is 
generally made at night to avoid e>^iif)s!Tij; toe troops to aerial 
observation and interdiction lire. Tlie preparation of the attack 
requires a mass of powerful, well-supplied artillery, which must 
he placc^ Jin po9ltt$i;ijin!PP^ly and hftveits.fite oaref^Uy ptepaied. 
This ar^OIi^ opMt& ]t^e!«d{r Jw^tbs^^&titryby a psepe^^OD'to 
shatter the €lnemy's morale, dieorgaiii26 hisisystoln of command, 
destroy his material obstacles, and neutralize his fire. The army 
commander iiroscribes the prinei[jal feaiiires and the duration of 
this preparation. He dislril;utes to corpe heavy tiuiks to over- 
come important obstacles that can not be destroyed diu'ing the 
artillery preparation. Surprise playe a large part in success. 
Even when a long artillery preparation is necessary, surpiise 
should be sought by a judicious selection of the.:^uust hour. of 
attack. For the attack, the .«imy «ommandeir issues detailed, 
pirecise orders which assure close. cootdinAtion of effort, prescribe 
special measures for holding th^itrouiid gftihed, sQdtinkke definite 
provisions for exploitation. 

44, Attack on a stabilized front. —On a stabilized front 
where close contact has Jong been estahliirhed, the offensive battle 
generally opens with the attack, without preliminarv maneuver. 
^.epMit 1mi:owM4&^ j# enemy diapositions. and the protection 


ftflorded by our front, permit preparations for the attack to bepin 
well in advance. To give the advantage of surprise, these prup- 
uatiau MSitDadei .in. bb^^.- Ofteu ^tbeibattle against a stabilized 
tiixat ifaaifciodtidaiiheiirgmtgaaonjtf HB«raiUf»«rao^ 
Tbeae Boiati'^ake 'nada^exBerlibxi'eawmy ifroatiuiiiB) & last .jmBb 
aefiiiitelt breaks it ' 

'is. Repulse. — When: fee! battle ends in a cliock (o the 
Hssaiilt, the wrmy commander at onoc restrictK the cfTccfs 
of the check by taking firm possession of the gioimd. Under 
the protection of the fresher troops and of the artillery, he reforms 
bia army and promptly reorganizes units whose lossee require it. 
Be completes his ammunition supply and-ieipiao^entt so that he 
may eoon Tesume the oSensivb. : . r . 

L : 46v SbcpIoit»ti|«m .«noejiiH(.«>-rC^l^^ the 
me^^s poiS^snstmiild neiand^i3ifl«nd!af rtiie'>6&rai(l^e battle. 
Iminedia^ and Utenidve: expMtEttiOn of the adrantoge gained 
it nesaBsa^ to oottplbte the enemy's disorganizatioih and prevent 
Ms refonuing his forces. For this exploitation, all first-line 
tioopsfitto fight, and the cavalry, eontituie to press forward, pre- 
*eeded by the aviation. Their first duty is to keep contact with 
tlie enemy. The cavalry operates, where possible, in the gaps or 
on the wings of the enemy's front, and attempts to g^t- aerom 
his lines iol retreat. Ttie combat ^.v^ttibw opBi^ttes^ against tite 
memy'n Bne« i<tf :Tetreat< and 6ndeain>is 4e:nHEU^ eolumnff and 
tmlne' -to impede idieir "wittidr^sl. It aJsoi'WttMks ths''ebemy 
elements^ still eSecttre, iU' rear of Uie fighting line. Them it 
nndeii tew-altitude machine-gun and bomb fire and tries to dis- 
perse them. 

If the enemy succeeds in forming on a new position, the recon- 
naisaance of this position is made without delay. The army 
commander, who should already hfive begun advancing his 
troops «iid materU^i xedis tributes them for the new attack, which 
he' organizes «a iqtnoUyi«af0iS)nibl«. ' M the saii:^ tiMe^he recon- 

.,K't' ni.!^.f,^eTOOM 'EH "•...'.'«•' ! I •<r>''l 1 

47. Orgfinization of tlia reuse. — The power of the | 
defense rests on a systematic coordination of the defensive fire 

all arms, a correct organization of the ground, and the timely 
use of reserves. By these n^ns, an army eomnu^deTt wJjo has a 
i^rly tUough«.o«t flt^ >amdi^a fl^ ^de^ ^Maif'Bue- 


The army- «0inw)9inder formulate Ms ^ d«fen$6.a|td pro- 

mulgates it ia field o^d^.. .He[#ve«(ihi8i<^^teommandaes Ms 
estimate of the dtuAMon, «adJb)^^k!wt£« M9 £@)£mlplwa <^ .di^enw 
against any of the moat: probable enen^ attacks. Under condi- 
tions imposed by the mission and situation, he selects the main 
line of resistance of the first battle position so as to utilize best 
the terrain of tlie army zone of action. Ho placeK continuous 
aones of hri.; Jind obstacles in front of the line of resistaiioft so as 
to hold u p 1 1 u ' a ttaek and prevent infiltration . f 1 e rga 1 1 i ^.e s t h e 
intffltior of the posttioa fQ>vi^i^^u;^ |^ rj^estabiisjbimi^t of a 
def<«isive barrier ag«»»t'etem(ffiisiiRfai(^im^:pBnj^ate ^« stain 
line .of : resistance. ■ 

The corps commanders distiibute their forces and combine 
their various kinds of defensive Sxe in order to preserve the 
integrity of the battle position and to regain parts of it tempo- 
rarily lost. The defense of the main battle position is essentiaily 
their mission and they should be prepared to use all means at 
their disposal to accomplish it. 

The outpost position, well in front of the line of resistance of 
the battle position, afTords the army time :tO: prepare for battle 
and sexeesBj the battle position from ^BBmy ground observation 
and reisfflmtdBMmfi&r It taktlt tb%i&ffit shock of, t^e enemy 
assault troops and i^otects tb» battlfiLipodtton.fTQBa tiie enemy's 
ntantry weapons. 

The army commander carries out defensive preparations 
under the protection of the outpost and the artillery. Mean- 
while, he uses his observsition aviation to ascertain the enemy's 
probable intentions. - He directs its reconnaissances methodically 
and takes precautionary measures to protect 4t>fi?oni the enemy 
piursui^ Krjftt^.Mi.jKiiiah fissemkliBg^pfeftiu'atory tO: tlie 
attftck. Finally, he seeks to thWirt the enemy plans by des^nw- 
tton, harassing, and interdit^oBifiiisdBpd! by aerial ^ai^»ek. 1 

To be prepared for any breakthrough of the main line of 
resistance of the first battle position, the army commander lays 
□ut in rear cf it successive battle positions, sufficiently distant 
from om- iiiin'her, that no rear position can be taken undtr the 
enemy preparation fire until the position in front of it has been 
oaptured. He organizes them in a manneir similu to .t^vftstt 
battle positinnu, I Lai ;i ; 1: .] iinv •t«l"'t>f' 

He may «tadbiMi»(i«t^ |M^ldatii%'JaUl «at itnwaiMwNltciMid 
resting on the line of li^Bto&ca of tha fizstliwl^ poel^n and 
on successive poc^tions, to limit .penetrationB, to maintain the 
contlBu% of tbia. jb(Stti and U>, ivtsitAi ^i^iBg^js tm 



counterattacks, ile should take spraial precautions that these 
positions do not hinder the movements of reservea. The army 
ettGoioatider will find that successive potdtione wtU afford him 
ibflity to maneuyer. It iB of first Importande that h& tiaase 
'«Mfa xbRav>fcB«lud(iig ttsiself, to kaKtw U» piOBt 'aim} Ms'iM^rtlti 
'titi defi^&e 'a&d'be^o^flmed in tbls knowledge by rehesiml. 
Fe shoalci avoid ciangss Of defensive dispositions immediately 
before >iri attack, because of their confu^in^ and demoralizing 

Distance from the enemy may require him to have the cavalry 
and special detacliments maintain contact in front of the line 
of outposts. Before battle, he should echelon Mb units Id depth 
and'tfroti^ them by outpolte'bibfnd which the; may rest and 
pftrfioim- aeiMflAa]^ labor. >^0'jttw oyetpoet't>ststtleii| be'-sbmtld 

aasigiied.' ^^'j^igiecn^^lil^diirtedi^! ilfeli»et» of flrst-lice corps 
in the fi#t bi^tt(i)jt(»itteD,<io»<i!i&lnedifitelji In rear of it, where 
they can opportunely occupy the posititms in which they are 
to fight. 

A disposition with corps abreast favors (k'fuiipe and the 
exercise of command. For the purt)oee of muneuver, especially 
if he contemplates passing from the defensive to the oSenSive, 
amty: feamnaadw wiU do well to hold fttin^ oorp» in 

«"-B» asKtgM me^Wio ^is amiy e<oii» in aoeordaiice with 
ndsMbus, the nftttiraJ drvislons of terrain, the communications 

available, and the probabk; (lirrciioij of the enemy's attriek. 
He prescribes measures of liaison Ix-Uveen army corps as ivcll iis: 
with the armies on Siis flanks. When (hi- army is itself a flank 
army, he takes measures to prottiet his flank by fortifications 
wad. reserves. 

In the defensive battle, he should see that all troops are pre* 
^^ased^toiilis^ tlti^ part fn eatattUsbiiig a oontiniLious line <rf'&re, 
«1»:iitdi!ltt«i?1^fll«ror to reestablish its continsity, first at the 
■ fifflM^ yidge df the battle position, and then, U fi^r-be, within 
it. He should, therefore, dispose his troops in dept^ tk disposi- 
tion which w^il) also decrease their vulnerability and favor the 
launching; <.if efjuiitcrattaeks. He may direct small garrisons to 
occupy critical points in rear of the battle position. He should 
dispose his reserves in rear of the first battle position, so as to 
pennit theii timely um in maintaining its inteiplty. 


The commanders of large units in reserve reconnoiter to 
ietermine the employment of their units, and issue the necessary 
iiWtructions for the performance of work assigned to their troops. 
''' "The army commander should so echelon his artillery in depth 
that itis fire efieet may be appUed continuously throughout the 
operation. He should dispose it behind the main battle position 
so as to attack the assembly areas and thi- line of departure of 
the enemy attacking elements (1,500 to 2,00(1 yards beyond his 
outpost position), as well as the outpost ijosition itself and the 
terw-in within his battle position. Ho may puf;h forward tempo- 
rarily some 'latieries to deliver distant interriief ion and speidial 
flanking Sre, He may place, provisionally, the artillery of Ms 
reserve in the successive positions brg^hiised in rear of the main 
battle position^ 

THiei chief of ^illet^ of the iteny nbakes recoihinehdatitftis to 
the army commander for the general use of the artillery. He 
gives the necessary orders to elements of the army artillery held 

at his (lispo.Hal. 

48. Conduct of the defense. — By complete preparation the 
army commaiifier develops the defensive strength of his army 
and its capacity for prolonged resistance. During the course of 
the battle he influences the action by the direction of the fire of 
his artillery and by the use of his rsiseryes. Thniughou t the battle, 
iie should hnpri^ aH rask^ witli his ditdhiM^tiou to win 
-fight in the first battle position. 

When information indicates that the enemy is preparing an 
atljick, the army commander orders powerful interdiction fire to 
strike the enemy by on his roads and approaches before 
he ean form for .iltaok, ^^'h(•n the attack is imminent, the 
army commantier order.s count(T]ii'eparation fire to disorganize 
the enemy's attack before it can get under way. He places fire 
Upon the enemy infantry and artillery as well as upon the pnn- 
cipal known centers of the enemy command system, such as <iiki^- 
mand posts, obaervatioa posts, and communicatioh :asiBia»k'i 
may continue, at the same time, interdiction fire. ' Sl^i^ 
tion and counterpreparation may involve a large expenditiii^bs 
ammunition, he fixes the duration of this fire to oonfotm Ti& 
supply, an<i prescribes the conditions under which corps and divi- 
sion commanders may order it 

If, notwitlistaiidiiig the counterpreparation, the enemy launchei^ 
his attack, the army commatider delivers defensive fire to stop 
the enemy advance by breaking up the attack io its initial 
phases. He places fire fizst upon (he Qru^Ktst Area, tshen in 


frout of the line of resistance of the battle (>oaitioii, and, tiiially, 
within that Une wherever the enemy has peonetrated. With 
this fire he maiy. a^yi^atoftWWlS *?ftW^jP^; ijpiintwliattery fire, 
cmd interdiotioafixe onrcmtM by wltk^ th««)^^ may reinforce 
the attack. But the all important targets for the artiUery are 
the enemy taoks and infantry, wtiich the artillery seeks to crush. 

Combined with this defensive fire in front (rf the organized 
positions of the defense are bands of fire of tlie automatic infantry 
weapons. If the enemy brt;aks tii rough the ol>atuck;s and the 
defensive fire, tlie infantry fights at close ()uarters with fire and 
with the bayonet. 

Counterattack regains lost ground, Firet-line units make the 
first counterattacks befpre the enemy baa solidly .established him- 
self. The division commanders place elements designaibed . to 
make counterattacks in favorable positioiiji for executing such 
missions. They anticipate the different situations which may 
arise and plan the actions of counterattacking units accordingly. 
The deeper the penetration of tlii; line of rcsi.slaiice the more 
.p^Etensive is the couiitcnUtMfk. Division and t^iiriw commanders 
.^ganize and l:iii[icii t-i n i i.tL.'rattaciiis speedily, bni- rnordination 

E, not be saciiticed for speed. Large counterattacks are 
lally executed by troops in reserve which have previously 
placed in position, haye the. befiefit. of an artiliery 
preparation, and are preferably rieisfOTced "with tanks. . The 
principles of offensive action govern the conduct and exploita- 
tion of such attacks. 

If the enemy attack involves tlie front of several army corps, 
the army eoniniaiider himself must recstalilijili liia line, by giving 
liis <inli.'r..i directly to his reserves aiitl l.iy enortiiiiutin;^ flie itre 
and action of the Large units involved, lie causes the troops 
engaged, while awaiting the launching of the counterattacks, to 
hold their ground tenaciously, to cling tp the d^enjjive lines 
remaining intact, and to build up a contlmious-line of fire. 

49. The cou^t«raSeturiTei. — When defwisp^ is, sound and well 
designed, the advantage of surprise is in favor of the defense. 
Defense should be a condition, of restrained activity in preparation 
for a counteroffensive. If a defensive position has been so well 
thu^en tliivt it can not he turned and must be broken before the 
enemy can reaeli liiK olijective, the adviintages of dexterity pass to 
the defen.'Hive. Tlie danger of the defe!..sive is fi;;n it nmy be so 
prolonged tltat tlie commander and his subordiuates become fixed 
i?} a defensive attitude of min^.fljfhifth leRders them incapable of 

A MANUAL FOR oimimmnwe^ 0^ .hAZSE umvm 231: 

A: successful defeisse depeudsiupaa.ihe preservatiogj ,of thafi^Ceit- 
sive spirit, which should manifest ttself by countexattheka; but 
all counterattacks should be mere preliminaries to the coimter- 
offensive ordered at the opportune moment. While on the defen- 
sive, the army commander must prepare everytiiing (or an over- 
whelming counter offensive. !Ie should issue warning instruc- 
tions weii in afivaiice, and Ije on tlie lookout for the proper 
moment to launch It. Re has chosen his own ground for a tri^ 
of istlrengthv His, tcoopa^are protected on familiar groundf wbile 
ther eQ«uca|r ia; /expased.'^ Bxi f « m iilt y . gTOi^ Jollowijos a serir 
ofla check ito the enen^ ^md'iir «B@9stifl]i- of & mfmenyer prepared 
in advance, the army commander should pass speedily to the: 
offensive. He begLos the eounteroflensive with the troops in 
action, and by using reserves of arms, which lie carefully places 
in position, and to which he judiciously assigns zones of action 
and objectives. All of the artiilery , supports the launching. of 
the eounteroflensive. , • .'j 

50. Withdrawal from action.— It!9lkB|!>-beithat:the fortmiA 
of war favors the enemy. When it Is no longer poeaUile to Si^tn 
ttnue the struggle on ft sc^id front, tihe aro^ commawiec n\u«% 
withdraw his forces to a ip<M£i4oaiStcffice9aj^.' distant from liM^ 
enemy to permit ieorgahls:at^sf]^i.iaid t^Ihforcement. He takci^ 
advantage of darkness to mosrStei^e rear, unseen by CJiemy air 
reconnaissance. In the ivithdrawal, he takes special jiaiiis to 
have flank protection and liaison with neighboring units. 

He specifies the direction of retirement, allots zones and, If 
necessary, routes, and decides on tlie conditions of execution of 
the movement. He prescribes measures to alleviate t«he handt* 
ships of the retiremeiit asd to supply the t£#i>pS( f^ iSigitiiK^ 
the withdrawal of. tite^aviatloa in suoh ai < wsy^ias> ta; protec$r#ft 
ground installaticHiB'-Bi^rat' i^^miBe itme iasBU^ continue 
participation in the action. He isquires all available comba# 
aviation units to delay the advance of the enemy. In that 
Underl akit;f(, appropri.ale comtnaiidcrs ma,y refjuire the aircraft to 
execute attack mi,'iaions at low altitudo. He causes demolitions 
to be made iilong the routes of the enemy's advanee to delay his 
march.and interfere with his supply. He specifies a line on which 
the army corps shall establish their rear guards to protect the 
movements of their main bodies. He setects l^iis line.ait |suo)fej|t 
distance from the'^eimy ttuttr^ie lemrigiitadajeaa'idoiHl^/ ftpo^ 
tioia and pr^^ats! defensivei .b<SfOi« b^ng attacked. SJhft 
cavdry, tfielofaiitr^umts, ahd^««i)fldaj^ tl^^ 


anrl avaMtJfetiilir Us uae, are immediately placed on the line of 
rear ^ua^ds t6 bi^anize that line. 

51, Reliefs. — If no crisis is at hand, Uie army oommaiidei 
soes that units ffiSgaged in a ptolonged tieteiisive battle are with- 
draws befatO''^^6ef 'are completely worn out. He may then use 
them «gaiB is tihe btittle after a rest in rear areas. He prepares 
in adv&nce for every ifelief by detailed orders. He uses weU- 
considered measures, not only to protect tlie troops from useless 
hardships and losses, but also to preserve the con-tinuity of the 
front. He sees that every relief is proiTded by reconnaissance 
and by consnl(:itiiiiis bi twcen the. stalls and the units concerned. 
Ilia onivr.-; fur rclirf cli-ii'ly specify the conditions under which 
the comni;itiders of relieving units assume command of the front 
assigned them. 

52, Betreat. — The army conunander covei^ bis retirement by 
delaytl]^ acftions^ He carrifft out these actions by placing suc- 
cessive .echelons ot troops in positions beforehand, each of which 
fi^'back on the echelon in rasr aftar the ©ompletioS of its 
mlSfliotj. He uses artillery, oavalryt and aviation as the principal 
elements of maneuver in retreat. He breaks off combat at night, 

lli^ comliiiK's delaying actions with destruction of the commu- 
nications Hbandoned to the enemy. He orders his demolitions 
in accordance with instructions from the comtiiiiisdcr in chief, 
He generally makes them along a front and throughout a dcptli 
which will completely deny to the enemy the use of the roads, 
railroads, «anaU, or landing fields essential to bis advance, The 
army engineer prepaMa a- i^an' of d^diition to be put into. eSeot 
usdet vatiouis s^esumptionB. Some demolitions will be. completely 
prepared and equipped with ex plosives; others will be partly 
[irepart'd; and slill others ivill tru rely be planned. Though the 
arniv comiii.aiidi^r nnrinrilly orders tlie execution of these demoli- 
tions, hr may deii-iirUr tlii^ autliority to the cDmiiiiuiders of cor[)s 
aad divisions, iifti^r pre.scrihing the conditions under which thev 
may bn nxecuterl. 

63. Stabiliaation. — There may be periods when the mission 
of itlxearmy ia simply to hold a front in contact with the enemy. 
During such periods the army cbnmumder or^nizessiid ffitiKengtb- 
en* the defense of his aeoton Pajrtaf of it te*afly ;|^ve.« defen- 
dve strength comparable to that of a permanently fdrtified-ffont. 
The preparation for defensive action and the condtjct of the 
defen-^e run form to the nharacteriatics of stabili station. The 
army commander prepares his. fiBh^sorders in minute detail. He 

Hon of the. groUBd-lljaproves. He may reduce them to a minimum 
if tlie reinforcements required are foreseen and an dfeclive plan 
for their cin|il()y[nrnl, hiis bi;en prepared, ffe develops the rear 
area of the army to facilitate movement and to assure the supply 
of the maximum force likely to be used. He emfiloys all the 
means at his disposal to uncover the offensive plans of the enemy. 
Throughout the period of stabilization, be should bear in mind 
the eventual resumption of otTenaive operatiana, aad should 
his troops fit for offensive action. 


Simoit I. G«Detal^..„.„ , ' . , ■'-„ ■■■„■,■■■,■■■,■■.■■„.., . ' -1(4% 

Section I 


54. Organization and functions. — The corps is primarily^, ■ 
tactical unit of execution and maneuver. It can eagaK9,(m^^r 
tended front and can carry on a battle until a decision is reached. 
It normally has two to four divisions, but the numlicr during 
Qietual operations may be greater. The successive phases of the 
combat may result in changes in the number and pbsitions itf 
reserve divisions, and in tbs allotment of divisions and spoci^ 
troops to corps. In actions of long duration, the divisional units 
are relieved by fresh units; but the corps remains until a decision 
ia re a rhed or the strategical plan is changed. It has an organiaa- 
tion so flexible that it can absorb .«e4.J>d^Ml9«^nfdn;t]l^ 
form part oi a liigher imit. 

Except when the corps is acting independently, or when ad- 
ministrative and supply functions have been delegated to it )»r 
the army, the corps has administrative and supply functions |p 
the corps troops only. The general principles for the army api^ 
to the corps when the corps is acting alone. When the eoirps ie!^ 
part of an army, its operations are influenced by many supply 
and lojristic considerations that are above the immediate respon- 
sibility fif tiie eoi ])s eommander. 

86. Plansand ordiajB,— Tljgporj^^ijq;^^ 

■Wli^SHhy ; he issues orders to divisionlPiteSJ^her units under his 
crtntrol; he allots artillery and speeia! trOOpfe to divisioris based 
on ihe tactical plan; and he coordinates the efforts o( divisions 
and of the corps troops. He superintends the relief of divisions 
by reserve divisions. He prepares plans for the use of the reserve 
in tlie variouB contingencies that may arise in battle. Counter- 
ftttaoks of the corps reserve are launched under his orders. 

To MiiaWiM^ d^t^iib^ sebi^s coniia^tidet gives his orders 
to Ws divlBion commanderB, te ttie edftsaatiders ftf the non- 
divisional units, azfd to his chiefs of services. He is responsible 
for the plan and the coordination of the parts to be taken by the 
different elements of the corps, but he should leave the details of 
execution to subordinate commanders. During the battle he 
keeps in tpufjh with the action of the front-line divisions, and in- 
fiuences-the combat.througb^ the,<)CH3te}«8[!Us;!iKtrps Ai^e)'7i 
ttO^dinatiitg ^ aetien-t^^U ihe'^ SiiitiNta^te'«0#ps,'and by 
the uae of corps reserves. 

56i Artillery. — The corps commander orders the artillery 
preparation as directed hj the army. He infiuencee this prepara- 
tion along the corps front by the allotment of ammunition and 
the coordination of corps and divisional artillery niii^sions, Corp- 
headqtinrtors is the agency of control of eounterbattery work. 
It iii:u- u*(^ the- artillery of front-tine divisions to supplement the 
forps artillery for this purpose. 

OrdinarUy all 75- millimeter guns, in addition to divisional 
artillery, are allotted to front-line divisions; but the corps may 
htold some' light artillery under its control. It may attiwsh addi- 
mmai iSS^m!SBM!6ti^ >fi!owltl^-to fiont^Uaef divMion^ 11? Wdi- 
mMr'%tmid'bti&im'i:^'miiX and all 

teng-range artillery. The c^g^pf^ifdBtirols interdiction and hajase- 
feg fire by assigning missions atfd by allotting ammunition to 
divisions and to the corps artillery. Tlie corps connmand«;r orflers 
counterpreparation fire pursuant to instructions from the army. 

commanders are authorised to order local counter- 
prefparatibn ftre. The corps chief of artillery provides for the 
distribution of the corps artillery and the reinforcing artillery; 
be ^MirdiQateB the actittt of all a^t^ery wi^iih thii corps, iuclud- 
■fad^ ttie' totiil^ of the divialons; and'<&e tt'rt^6nslble for the 
iStt^is^atfHfl&y'amiioitinition supply, 
' Oii^pe aiid aifffly commanders should sptire no efforts to secure 
to each division the support of its own artillery brigade on the 


I 1BI^&^^^^ — '^^^ diseuflsslon that follows treats of the corps 
■ffiMMe as part of an army, when ft is erajjloyef! for the acoom, 
plishment of missions uitliin a zone of action ihat in designate^ 
by the army commander. Aside from the requirements an^ 
timitatiuiiri imposed by :u-my ordere, the action of the corps to 
^,^1*^^ influonced by what iaaccpmplisbed by units in adjacent 
sty^ftsof action. 

,. 68. march to battle.— At a distance from the eneiM, 
the corps commander disposes his unit in accordance with tM 
concentration area, direction or zones of advance, and roads 
assigned by the army commander, and with the corps plan of 
development to be tarried out upon encountering the enemy. 
The road net often has an important bearing on the formation 
adopted by tljc corps. When the probable method of emplqy- 
meuf can i)e foreseen, the forniation of the corps shoiUd,be.fUph 
as to f acil i t :i I (■ i t.s entry iiito 'actios. An interior cotps iiot-maJdn^ 
the main effort of the army and with an objective not requirljjg 
the use of a reserve diyisiqn, would march with all divisions 
abreast. A flank corps, or a corps making the main effort of the 
army, would march with one or more divisions in seeojad line. 
Corps troop.^ are assigin-d such position^, in th^. fQrin«jUf]iiLa4jvffl 
facilitate 1 heir em ploy nw I it, - ■ trwin* 

The army commander may rufrulatu the march by prescribing 
lines to be i-eaehed upon the completion of successive stages of 
the march- These stages may be of several days' duration. 
To control the march, the corps commander prepares mare^ 
tables, which preaoribe the hours of march, zones of advance 
or routes, and the successive lines to be reached by the advance 
guards, and by the heads and tails of the infantry divisions and 
separate units of the corps troops. 

Upon approaching the enemy, the corps commander develops 
his ci.iiim.'uul from its march dispositions. He puts it into 
formation j^uitable for maneuver and combat, in accordance 
with an ii.';jiii,nied direclion and frontage He orders a greater 
concentration on the mareliing front and closes up the marciiini| 
columns. He makes such a disposition of divisions and of corps 
til^na. as to insure aexibility of maneuver and prompt avafl^ 
afiility for combatjpf aiiy .elw^t ih l^e command- : ^6 raquii;^ 


the oorpa avl&tipn to mip^lement th9 leconn^ieaaiwe of ths army 

69. Security and reconnaiasanoov— AviaUoB and the army 
cavalry should mnke the lirHt contact with the enemy. If cav- 
alry is attar:h(;il to the (■m-ps, the corps coramantk'r mirmally 
attaches it to the divisions to assist in security, or tonal recon- 
naissance, and to maiiutiiu liaison with the army cavalry. The 
flret-llne divisioaa furnish the necessary advance guards to pro- 
vide march Beouiity on the frotst of the oorpa. Eventually the 
eorps establishes contact with the enemy through the forward 
movement of the advance guards, which take over the line of ' 
contact when the progress of the cavalry Or other reoonnaJssanoe 
groups has been definitely stopped, or when they are driven bacic 
by tbe enemy and have uncovered the advance guards. In 
either situation, the advance Ruards, supported by artillery and 
baclsed up by the divisions to which they belong, push on their 
advance to develop the enemy's strength and determine his first 
Une of resistance and his dispositions in rear. When the ad- 
vance guards can make no further progress against the resist- 
ance of the enemy, they cover the deployment of the main 
bbd^ by holding a line which may serve eithor as a line of 
Si^ttttte ior an attack, or as an outpost position for a temporary 

' attock against an enemy occupying a prepared defensive 
liOfe'-iir 'position requires moro cxtensivr- tirci i:ir;Lf ions than does 
the attack of an enemy in a deployed dcfeiiKe. The corps com- 
mander muatt obtain the most exact information possible of the 
enemy's deffensive organization and plan of defense. He must 
ptoVlde for more power on a restricted front, a stronger artillery 
pr^imration, and a greater continuity of action. These factors 
will tend to delay the time of attack. Before launching an at- 
t:ick, he nifiy find it necessary to drive in the enemy covering 
dui:ic lime tits and to execute a reconnaisBance in force against 
the enemy's first position. Usually he must make, under cover 
of darkness, the approach to a line of departure preparatory to 
an assault. 

[f, in a meeting engagement, both sides are intent upon main- 
taining the offensive, the corps commander must direct his 
efforts toward gaining and holding the initiative and forcing 
tdfl adversary to take the dafensive. He can best accomplish his 
^ugrpos^ by inaMng a skSlf ul use of terrMn. and by * rapid deploy- j 
Janit or ^tisf^ mamnivBt that will insult ' In iep»owt^t^ a 

A-ttmv&ti MS e^ttmm»E;Rs o p tj&Rm units M 

00. Oonduot ot tbw :«t1iB«]b*^The oon^^ 
p«res to attack with the taascfasiaa iiSbft femsistent vifth iW 
continuity of action dem.inded to carry out the mission assigned 
the corps, f t may ha necessary for the corps to attack alone; or 
it may Eitt;ick in conjunction with neiRhboring corps. In a joint 
attack, the pliin of action of the corps must harmonize with the 
plans of .-idjacent units. Generally, higher authority assures this 
coordination; but, in the absence of orders or instructions, the 
corps commanders will assure it, 

Ji)ependisg upon his mission, the army plan of attftoki tbs 
enemy situation, the ground, and other p^lnient ta«torsi tbe 
corps oaimmander decides upon iiis .^MstJOsltlon for the attack. 
He seeks to deliver a main blovr at some essential or vreak point, 
by organizing a main attack upon which he concentrates a maxi- 
mum effort. This main attack he supports by secondary attacks 
or holding attaeks aking the remainder of the ctjrps front. He 
may make the main attack either in conjunction with the main 
attack of an adjacent unit, or subordinate to it, 

Be^ assigns, to the first-line divisions their missions, general 
line of ttepartuxs and direotton of attack, zones of action, the 
time of attack, and, if necessary, their egeceseive objsctiveit. 
He determines the support and coordination necessary b^ween 
adjacent divisions to carry out suucessfully the corps scheme of 
maneuver. !Ie prescribes the assembly areas of divisions ta 
corps reserve. He distributes to divisions such additional units 
of artillery and tanks as the individual tasks and the ground 
may make advkable; .He leaves ^tiffi details of exeeutiOB to tbe 
division commandenk 

The corps commander controls arUllery oombat against enemy 
artil Lery . Usually icounterbatt^7 is a duty of the' corps artilteTy , 
but the corps ^Omitiander may delegate it in patt tor^ei first^Une 

In addition to ootmterbattery, tbe corps artillery supplements 
the fire of the artillery of the divisions where greater power or 
greater range is required. With the artillery, the corps commander 
effects heavy concentrations at vital points durint; tbe course 
of the battle, particularly at points where the main attack may 
be temporarily checked or where a counterattack is imminent. 

In the attack, order the cotps: commander issues instructions 
for the employment of the .cor^m aviation, to which he aaslghs 
definite observation 'miBstons. fie asdgns balloon companies to 
assist In generaJ obsaBvatkm iaad in a^ustdng artillery firalm 


A Manual FOR coMMANBsna of LARaa trKirs 3S 

stfpiplemeitt tb« obsearvaMoQ aoiiliHdji^^ fire by 

biOIoonB, chiefly ob targets mBttkedtfrom baUoceo obB^atiMX. 
He 'C!iK>rdinale3 the missions of all aviation within the e6>>ps. 

As long as the enemy continues to offer an organized resietance, 
(hi; corps conitiiiiiider applies all his resources to tin,' task of 
i fuTtiiig the enemy's disorganization. When in a rapid advance 
t:r,ji[imvmication becomes diflicult. fuui inftjnn.ation menKtr, he 
must place great dependence! upati tlie initiative of division com- 
manders. He muist, therefore, eupply them with all the nitiaris 
^OBsiltile for the acwmpliahment of their tasks. He tnay atlot 
e^ogtoe^ troops to divisiouB, of cegu^ the oofrpa engine^ eeriyteo 
to take over certain donstiCuctton wpik tii-^ »)Des.o£.ai0bi(u!>^ 
the divisions. ; , .1 , • 

If the attack is checked, he must get his forces ia'tisndjagainv 
and prepare speedily to renew tlie attaci; witli a power eofficient 
to Ijreuk down the eiu^niy resistance, 

61. Heaervea.— When the corp.s has a limited objective, it may 
attack with all divisions in tlie front line and hold out a small 
reserve. Wben it is:. making a deep . advimee: or is making the 
miin leSorl dt tbe emxj)f^"ii'. tM>13s ona t^'i^ote^idelioist in roeemre. 
When- the t attack -haf bean Initnted^>'t^ itbTpwieomxc^d'^mxatS 
hie influence on the; 'tide -of bstttl^ and lnsm^s the esseoittiUf'eoti-^ 
tiniiity of action tfirousth the corps artillery and the I'orps re- 
serves. Ho places the reserves initially and moves them as the 
tiattle pro£;ress£'s, so (hat he may best iish ihem whi'n needed. 
He must dispose them so that they are capable of marieuver 
behind the firet-line divisions and yet are within striking distance 
of critical points. He may engage them by placing reinforoements 
from the reserves at the disposal of the conuuanders of firBt-lise 
^TiMdzia^ fa^-lnteodaciiigiK toppte isto the line, on a 
is&l^ ^bei£weeictwo: 'othei^'dii^ons; or by replacing a worn-out 

62. Exploitation of success. — In following up a .siicces.?fiti 
:ittiick, the subordinr.le comiijsinders must undertake the nctnal 
operations. But to gain decisive results, the corps commander 
must provide these subordinates with tlic means of accomplish- 
meat, and must coordinate their efforts. He will have to furnish 
fresh troops to turn the enemy's retreat into a rout. 

-. 68. Jtopulva.F<— Ifi all the efiorta In the attack fail to accom- 
pUsh the Jtnlsaios of the corps, the corps commander must take 
■tepa to resist aicousterattack. He must i<eoi^iantES hte'eoiieitoand 
tmdeii^t^ dditer of ' ^ aground aad^of artmes? fe^;i|i&d' reduce 

enemy. He must revise pbtm^' w^afasliate' jaBanRMHtfaay^ ■ ttSmei 
wom-eti^ troops, Atfd tdjU^^iW«ic»^te«e^U^^ 

Section III 


64. General. — The principles discussed for the employment 
of the army in the defense are in general applicable to the corps. 
Only matters applying directly to the.coiJHj as a part of :ftn,armj, 
will be outUnedijft. ^ pfu«kgra{>bB ^ift|((|(^'er,.j . , . 1 ., : 
as, lHi<mm> ia » m^ittUm easpRgeaMWtir^Ias a sm(^im 
6QijSS(«em^nti;ifrttk& gitos^on requires libe aasumption of .the ^ 
f^oeive, the commanders.of 'fiitBt-Une divisions wUl have responsi- 
bility and freedom of action, in: accordance with their assigned 
missions. The corps commander will employ the corps and army 
combat units at his dispo.sid to support the first-iine divisions. 
He will use his nir iinU-^ and other means of obtuining infurma- 
tion, to gain a timely grasp of the situation, so that he can make 
efteotiye use of the corps reeervea, oan provide for the: mutual 
coop^aMon necessary .between, fisstrUne. divisional tyjd oftu har- 
monize the conduct of the iaatMfi with rthe^iunita: adjacent, .t«.hi^ 
corps. . THo oox|» .commajiiter is.Msponsible for measures nec^e- 
sary for flankiipvotiection.iorpFeventhig-the development of gapi 
twtween adjacent divisions, and for assuring the active coopera- 
tion of all arms. If he has an offenMve mission assigned, he must 
direct lii.s elTorts tou'aid the assumption of the offensive at the 
earhest moment practicable. 

66. Position and aone defense. — The position defense and 
the organisation of a defensive zone may be;Eueeeati%e dfife^iB^,- 
ments of a deployed defense resulting freilaa'A IBefetyiq( 48^|g|^t 
ment; or they may be organized. wUk»&e enemy .is :yetwb. some 
distance; ' - ,1 ..• - , ii^-;r- • - •■ 

In the position defense or the organization of a defensive zone, 
the corps plan of defense is based upon orders from the arniy 
commander specifying the see tor to be occiipied by the corps, the 
general location of the successive positions or lines of resistance, 
and general instructions on the type of defense to be adopted. 
The corps may hold a jjosition with all divisions in front line, 
where the flanks are secured and the position is to be held for a 
limited time. > When the flankft^ara< not< pcoteoted, when Uisii^ 
fensive tvnfl is.txK bitifoQipm44^j» mmtx^miT^^ 


^oida. one or inQnijU'^b^w»M 'W'Wffie. . I^ssscKe !?Uwioiw.4>(»«? 

Q^cnii^ a second: poi^tlsa <H; Btaor Wteldii^^ 

to the posit ion. ' ■ it . 

No opportunity should be lost to throw up fomudable rear 
lines of defense. The corps ootnmander is responsible that addi- 
tional battle positiona are laid out aad prepared along his entire 
front to check and break up any enemy assault that may pene- 
trate the first battle position. 

67. Preparations for the defense. — A prelimin;ii y vn < upa 
tion of the pOBl-Uon liisiy be ordered prior to a terrain recon- 
n^Bsance; but this :de(t^^ orders for the occupation of the 
poeitiw and oonduet df; ths d^eose must be issued Mter a 
reooim^seanoe has been made by the ftorps o(»smander astdsted 
1^ his siafi, and ^ter the receipt of reports from lower com- 
liaatiders, which will enable him to reach defitsite deoiaiona on tho 
following essential points: 

tt. The general trace and amount of ornimixaLiun to be accoLii- 
[llished for each successive position, the ]>riority of work in the 
organization of the positions, and that part ol the organization 
of the ground to be perfonned by units in corps reserve 

6. Tbe distribution of the units to occupy the main battle 
t>olitioai Ki^ the bonndarieei between uttita. 

jc. The general eotheme for tbe conduct of defense the nuun 
battle position, and mutual support between adjiioent unite. 

d. The proportion of strength with Which the" outpost position 
is to be occupied, arid the general plan for the conduct of its 

e. The general disposition of tin; cnriis artillery, ami the plan 
leir 4ti! emploj'mcnt, 

-ilifi- The tasks for the corps aviation and for any cavalry that 
may ;be altaidied to the co^- 
< ^1 I^ee employment of tfaie corps engineer service. 

A. The des^nation and disposition of units to be held in corps 
reserve, and general plan for their employmmli! to meet antici- 
pated or possible contingencies. 

i. The general plan for the establishment of signal communica- 
tions within the corps and with adjacent units. 

j. The plan of administrtitiou and supply essential to the occu- 
jation and to the plan of defense. 

k. The methods and means of gaining information of the 
enemy before and after the establishment of contact. 

-68. Troopn tor ou'tpost poKltioiis- — The m^ons of the 



ftoribiid by the coi^ ooimntmd^. Troops for tl» Outpost posi- 
tions are furnished within iflwir reapeol^mseeMs bfi the&sNime 
divisiona. Cavalry In front of the outpost position, for eoiittM^ 
with the enemy, usually operate under army ord«a. 

If a covering force of infantry units, with artillery and cavalry 
attached, is placed in front of the outpost position, it may act 
as an iiuiepcndent command under army control; or ('ath corps 
may liu required to organize a covering force, under corps ooutrol, 
to operate witlilo its sector. 

69. Plan of aitlliery enaptoyment, — In his defen8«:DrdeCt 
the corps commander outUnes getneral pitta, t0r;tiSie>wa§&iBy>- 
wmt of all the artillery of the <^)rpSi ll^tuitE«>th&t of tiie dlvi- 
mona. He bases his plan upon the ^nuy t plan & artiUery employ- 
ment. He utilizes the corps chief of artillery to advise him on 
matters of artillery employment and coordination, and to prepare 
the detailed plans for publication. The plans usually should 
include provisions for the initial employms^nt of the artillery of 
divisions in corps reserve, anil provisions for those artillery units 
to join their respective divisions if they are called upon to enter 
the action. The earliest use of the corps artillery will be for 
interdiction, cpunterbattery, oounterprepAmtlan, and fire ia 
front of the outpost position tO reinf oroo 4^ SftiU^ 'tif tlli^ 
divisions. Some batteries must be fiu' enough. forwEud to eng^e 
in counterbattery and distant interdiction^ The plan must m^e 
provision for the eventual withdrawal of these units to prepared 
positions from which they can bring effective fire to bear in 
defense of the main line of resistance, and froici wliicii !i!l or a large 
part of the fire of the corps artillery may be concentrated at any 
point on the corps front at the will of the corps commander. It 
should include arrangement for tbiO sa;itu%l, (^.^^g^ty aci^i^t- 
anoe of the artiUery c^. 4^a«eat 0^p%.,{^4j<^^St%IUS»te^^ 
army artillery units. • 

70. Heserres. — Hie corps commander should place the corps 
reserves initially In position in rear of the main battle position. 
Be should select these positions so that he can readily move the 
reserves to any part of the corps front where their entry into action 
or partieipation in a counterattack might be of advant^e. 
Until an attack is iininintjnt, the reserves should be placed where 
they can carry out the tasks (jJlotted to them in the organization 
of the ground; when an attack is imminentj they are moved to 
their battle positions.- TM>^^.'i^i#sJ^9gl;^i$K0yei 
th^ resery^ i^, coustffBti b ^aj feB^^ tiS.'^ iOg^ 
second battle pi»i,tlon^ 


7%. CQndu&t; ol th* ctefeaw.— WIi«d ss attacK appears 
doWri j bfa ^. thei eotgg^onaftan^t' en^fe^to coriditfttHa imposed 
i>7 i^'-anuy fionmiian arSew the oi>enlhg of interdiction 
and oonntarprepamtion Are. He may request the assistance of 
IBaajj^auffcillery and of air forces at the disposal of the army eom- 
mander, in accordance with army and corps piana. 

The prepared plans cover the initial phase of the defense. 
The details of execution are left to the initiative of the subordi- 
nate ooTOmanders. After the battle has begun, the corps com- 
mander tsxsTUs his influence toward a BUccessfiil defense by 
maneuv^g the fire of the corps atfStery, byaiMsmg the corpa 
xeseiyes, astt by etintrelling suich 'a^isii&Eib^^'it^ <^^t>bttkfn 
ft^oM tlw ftrliiy artillery and army Matioti; "•Axu.f mrK^i 

The- corps commander mny use corps re^e?<rti^% •^^teBtSPT2fe 
front to meet tlie throat of enomy enYelopiiieitt5''*I^Willlf6Spije 
front-line divisions, to relieve worn-out iitiKs, or't^i^lfelablish 
the continuity of the main line of resistance, Blit'hls most 
effective use of tliese reserves is In a counterattack at the crucial 
moment and at the critioal places to ovetrwhelm the attackers and 
the success <rf tW&e^Hee;- BMi a'c&acnt^iittaek usually 
a wmdueted in' mecmoee^ t«th &' ^^rijeimaisea plan and is 
W3m03f''^^^i!t^WSi^ '6rtm (Setf^Hsf oi>^ii£Hferi 'He places 
aS'^iece^ary means at tin' disposal or in support of the unit 
BofiMnlf'tho counteraltf.ek to insure its success and to protect 
it'^^atest ]iosKil)lt; counterthrusts of the enemy. Heinsurtis tiie 
cooperation of othc>r troops. 

TS. Counter offensive, — If the defense is successful, the change 
to the offensive is made in accordance with Instructions from the 
armj' commander, '■' 

78. Wi^idya>:vai'fr6m aotidia,— If t£i«i gtoifcj j^dases- 

i£toa^^--*tiilNBS*^ tii9Mte- position, the corps comaiiiidier' puts in 
effect his plans for the defense of a second position where the 
ground has been fully or partly organized for defense. The 
withdrawal to the second position is covered hy an organized 
delaying action in which machine guns and artillery play a 
prominent part. Ttu' lirst-line divisions occupy the second posi- 
tion within their respective sectors; or, if the second position is 
to be defended by troops in corps reserve, the first-line divisions 
withdraw to ^OBltioffis in reserve in rear of the second position 
The witha<ii#ldi^ the artillery maiat be progres^ve, so as to 
K«iBp fliBiM#'tiM4 t»M!gble fn aettotai at all Mi&e&' A with- 
ilTftWal'to t>iaflititj!n If effiae^ 


If the corps is forced to retreat, the corps eomiSE^nid€* dlreettl 
that rear guards, strongly reinforced with machine guna and 
artillery, be formed and placed in position far enough in rear of 
the line of combat to organize their fire before being reached by 
the enemy's attack. Thcsrc rear iruards cover ihe retreat. Ttiey 
withdraw by echelon to successi\'e positions .suitable for delay in g 
action against the enemy. They employ demoUtions and such 
obstruotions and obstacles as they can imj^rovise to delay the 
OTiiniy. ■ ■' ■ " ■-' ■• ' '< ■-■ •-' ■- 

Chapter 7 


' '' Tm^asiSit 

IQ. The In^tcy dlTiiloD la defemdve battle 

Section I 

74. CompCKlQietti 4cnid cllftrac?bel!ia*aei.— The hifantry divi^ 

sion is the unit by which the army corpfi executes its maneuvers 
and engages the enemy hi battle. It is the basic large unit, of 
which corps and armies are farmed. It is the permanent 
unit. It is the largest unit in which officers learn to know one 
another well enough to form a closely knit organisation. It is 
the smallest unit that is composed of all the essential arms and 
services, that is designed to be titMc^^^ and administratively 
self-sustaining, and (hiat can ObndU(jt, by its d*n meansi a^>&c^ 
ations of generd linpmtiinoe. It cab' strike or penetrate effete' 
tively, move readily, and Sbwwb reinfdreli^ aniite easily. It cafl 
act alone or as a part ft higher unit. It Is the organization 
which olliecr.s and men love and cherish and about which their 
recollections cluster in aftertimcs. It is therefore the unit which 
promotes morale and a spirit of service. It forms a whole which 
should never be broken up. The combat value of the infantrj^ 
division comes from its ability to comljine the action of t^ 
various arms. Cavalry and aviation should be attached to aa> 
Infantry division acting independently. 

75. The division commander. — To initiate an operation tha 
division commander gives hia ordeni to tbe brigade oonunanderi 


ttrd to the commanders of tlie arms and services, flo assigns 
the entire battle front to infantry brigade conunanders. After 
t>^. |jaftu(tt]r3r .biig»(JeB b&y^ ;^QKUBiitted to action, lie ordi- 
tooily Ismies o^em te.tbeir commaAders only vrhen the situation 
requires important variations from the original plan. In action 
he watches the progress oi the hne of battle, and influences the 
combat through orders to the division ari.illcry and division 
reBfirve. The reserve includes all combat troops not engaged. 
The division eoimnander csontrols tt thioy«h ordeia to Ita.oom- 

70, Artillery. — -Primarily the division artillery assists the 
infantry front line. For: tiiie purpose the division commander 
asaigjW'it missions <tf support and retains it normally under his 
owfk controlr .%xeKieeA through the commander of the division 
aftfllery. wien tbeeombat brenks into disconnected local engage- 
ments, or In a sltufttion where the division cannot be employed 
as a whole in coordinated action, the division commander may 
attach to infantry units a part or all ot the division artillery. 

77. Signal communications. — The division commander, 
within the limits pr^cribed by tiie corps, regulates the operation 
of signal communications. Axes of signal communications arc 
prescribed for the diviKpn ;by:ttte corps, c^itmiiiajider and for each 
iii£^ti7'^f 4i)'>^4o%«op)mwd«7* . Sioptstimes division 
inigade iuiiea esteeidiqi. > ;Tlui^ itwB /^at^Ttde^ es far to the 
fiont as possible, and subordinate units keep in touch with them 
as the advance progresses. 

Advanced eommunioaiion centers, oper.ited under the direction 
of staff officers, arc CKl;!hlished on tlisjKt- a.^cs. 'They keep com- 
manders informed of the progress of the attack and transmit 
orders. The advajiced communication centers of the division 
are -frequently established near tlie command posts of brigade 
iS^xitoaiuGkMP;- ]3i«y may be pushed farther forward. Advanced 
CQBUl&uitie^W! leent^ are well supplied with personnel and 
IS^^ment. In battle the division commander should be in 
tsa^ communication with the commanders of his infantry 
brigadeSi division artillery, division reserve, csommanders of 
adJaeeBt divisions, and co^s headquarters. 

' vtt uulUnamnm^laliiM oi — .jf»l)rfnnnfgna AuisiTlb '^A'V 


Sbctios n 


78. The march to battle. — The division commander desig- 
o.ites the successive lines to be reached by the advance guards 
and main body. When the division is marching in more than 
one column, each column has its own advance guard. The infan- 
try advances in formation to facilitate its early deployment. 
The artillery ad van ces, prepare d to s u 1 1 [ > o i- i the a ( ! va 1 1 ce s u ards, 
and to enter promptly into action. Il mainfains close haison 
with the infantry, and pushes its reconnai.^^^anee well to the front. 
Aviation, aad cavalry if attached, reconnoiter the enemy, and 
obtain information upon his situation and the condlliton of the 
ground, communications, obstacles, and cover. 

In executing the march into battle in a meeting engagement, 
the advance guard should be relatively large j since, in such an 
engagement, the larger advance guard will be able to seize and 
hold important point's in the vicinity ivlien' conlaet is i^slalilisht d. 
The division commander may design air, in advance, important 
terrain features which the advance guards will seize during the 
course of the approach march. The advance guard, supported 
by artillery, dri^■ea in the enemy's covering ^l^'^'^oMin^ts 
develops iiis strength and dispositions. When ii cait mabe no 
further progress, it organizes a position suitable to cover the 
deployment of the division, and to gain the necessary time for 
the main body to complete its preparations. The division com- 
mander puts his artillery into action promptly, arrests the 
ward movement of the enemy, and, it necessary, orders the captuSe 
of such terrain features as will favor his subsequent attack. He 
keeps the corps comnianfier informed of the situation and [ire- 
parea to atl;K'k v. hcn directed. 

The division commander should lieep in close touch with the 
operations of the advance guard. He should estimate ihe 
gfcrength and disposition of the enemy and inform the corps 
copimander. When he believes that he is confronted by cover- 
ing troops only, he should endeavor to clear up the situation fc^ 
ordering such minor operations against objectives of important 
in the subsofjuent action as may be necessary. Tie should aid 
these operations by artillery support and Hanking fire. 


Confronted by an enemy in movement who is himself acting 
offensively , the division commander makes such diEpositions ns 
will fftvombty' influence the early srtages of ibe lJattle. He 
determises upon his general plari for battle as early as practicable. 
He can decide detaiis oi\\y wLcii the division gaiiisr toiitflct with 
the enemy, and evt'n Uitn lii!^ iufiu maf ion will l)0 relatively 
incomplete; but if ht* sponds too uuisrli timo and cilort in gaining 
information, he may lose the initiaUvt' ur use uji his force in 
piecemeal engagements. If his first task has not ijcen fixed by 
the corps commander, the division commander will determine it 
himself in the direction and in the zone assigned him. The 
tactical importance of the objective usually fixes his choice. 

79. Command posts. — To keep himself well informed of the 
progress of the attack and to exerd^, control, the division com- 
mander establishes a command p&et"fr&i which he can keep in 
close touch with the attacking troops, the artillery, aviation, 
and division reserve, and maintain communication with the 
corps commander and actjacciit units. Its iiiitinl ijt>.~i!iijri and 
line of advance are normally prescribed by corps oidei's. The 
cot^m&nd post should be easy of access and should be supple- 
mented by good observation posts. 

.. ^^he division commander fixes the position of the command 
posts of his immediate subordinates. , • 

The command posts of the division and of lower liniis are 
advanced in time; to facilitate the exercise of doinmand. Din ing 
tliis advance, detachnicnts remain at the old command posts to 
continue opci'ations until the ne^v are open. When a new com- 
mand post is or>e[it d, report is made to higher and lower com- 

During the action the division commander and the commanders 
of lower units may temporarily leave their command poets in 
order to influence the combat. Before leaving;, they make such 
dispositions as will insure the conduct of the action during their 
td^nce. , . . 

The personal reconnaiissati'ee of the division commander Is of 
the highe.=t importance. It is a duty which he can not delegate. 
He should be accompanied by one or more stall oliiocrB. On 
many occasions, the di\'ision cfmimander will be unable to conduct 
a comprehensive personal reconnaissance; but he should visit 
fetical points. He should make full use of automobiles and 
aiTcra/t. Atiovie aQ he sbnUld be4e^lneMliieiltly by the troops, in 

SO. Combat orders. — The combat orders of the divi.sion 
should be brief. Theie iviil usually be little time betvi'een the 
moij^t when the division commander receives his instructions 
froi^ higher authority and that when his subprdinates should be 
pi^pAx^d to execute hist own orders. It lit tooi» 
receive these orders m ample time to prepare for their execution. 

To gain time, the division commander will, when practicable, 
decide upon his essential dispositions in the presence of lus 
infantry and artillery brigade commanders and his staS. In 
order to start the movement promptly and to furnish the troops 
witii early information of the contemplated maneuver, he will 
make frequent use of warning ordera, 

T!u: coiiiliat orders of a division should follow tiie normal form, 
Occa,-!'i: lilly part s of theqs^^inay be advantageously illustrated 
or replaced by sketches or mape indicating the dispoeiliion of the 
iufaatfy, the artiUei;, the principal artil^z? tfu^et?, the cooir- 
di nation of artiUery fire with the infantry advance, and t^. 
signal communications existing or to be installed. 

81. Preparations.- — When tltpe to the enemy, the division 
commander will normally order the development of the division, 
a movciiniii wliich usually terminatesi in tlic octupation of the 
assembly (Kisition for the attack. He distributes the units in 
width and depth so that they may m&aeMyer jfB&\3i^^, i^Jl!o.,a4-~ 
vantage pf ground, and deploy rapidly. 

The assembly positions should afford cover or be be^oiid £tie 
effective range of eneiny artilkry. Measures to prevent obser- 
vatioa or attack by enemy aircraft should be taken. Troops 
d^SggUi be developed in the direction of the contemplated move- 
;l(^t and have access to favorable lines of advance to their 
deploying positions. Troops making an cnvelopint; niovi iiicELt 
take positions so that they may deploy straight to the froiit and 

While developing the enemy, the division makes its prepara- 
^ons for attack. It may be necessary, to execute minor attach 
as a preliminary to the proper execution of the main attack, in 
order to gsdn certain terrain features, to clear the front, or to 
provide flank protection for the main blow. The combataiijt 
forces are divided into the attacking echelons, tlie artillery, 
and ilie division reserve. The att:u:kir;i! i^'iielons com p rise a 
part of the infantry, tanks wiim vjciit-^siLry, and occasionally 
accompanying artillery. The division conimandcr l>^^s this 
iforee under the.-enicMES.of ,a ^ng^e brigade commander, or dis- 

14' H'lMSf^m w&n^mumt^tmss'i^KmMim vmm 

tributes it between both brigade commanders. This force 
deploys upon or is rear of the ground held by the advance 
goards and piepares fair action. 

The division (iommandier ahdotd dispose the tanks according to 
tbdr probable emplOTment and the adaptability of the ground 
for their nction. If ihey are exposed to observation, he should 
eajploy Ihenj iijxjii a wide front in or<lcr to avoid conceDtrated 
artillery lire. If a deep iidvaiice ie e-iiil-eiii plated, he should 
(Jivide tbeia into several tclielotis, so a.s to secure continuity of 

Wiien the development of the situation can not well lie foreseen, 
or where the ground makes liaison between the infantry and 
artillery difficult, the division eoinnunder may attach accom^ 
panying batteries or guns to infamt^ uidts. Such a use of 
artillery is exceptional. This accompanying artillery destroys 
obstacles and overcomes resistance at close ranges. It follows 
the infantry attack closely. 

The division artillery (lesis accompaiiyins artillery) is orgniitzeii 
into groups, if necessary. The greater ]:!ii t diiecily supijort."! tht 
infantry. To secure teamwork and liaison, the division com- 
mander may advantageously assign an artillery unit habitually to 
^he support of the same infantry unit. The supporting Are 
ti^x^MM&iai^tj^^ elosety, in accordance with a pre- 

arranged plan or upon requests for fire by the infantry unit. 
Such requests should be promptly met. 

Tl;c !-!;vi.-Loii e(>mi)i;iji(ler usually holds the hoiviti'ers with the 
(iivisiiiii iirtjilery under his own control in order he may 
influence the combat by concentrations of fire upon certain 
objectives or by extending the action of the lighter gims. 

The artillery (except accompanying artillery) is commanded 
by the division artillery brigade comm^der, who forms the 
groups, assigns tasks, and allots positions and observation posts. 
To avoid the necessity of eariy cfaang^, he i^otdd assign the 
artOlery initial positions as f arf orward as pratiticable. He should 
place, gjenersUy, each supporting battalion of artillery centrally in 
rear of the infantry unit which it supjioi'ta and where it may sup- 
port the rest of the ar(i!li>ry and join in the general concentration 
of fire. To obtain enfilade fire, some batteries may, by mutual 
agreement, be placed in areas of neighboring divisions. 

The division reserve consists of all unengaged units, which the 
division commander keeps under his immediate control, and, when 
tieceSisai?, of tanks. Th6 division engineers may be employed 
as reaerves. When the division has to maneumr tic bu an ex- 

posed flank, the division commander may find itexpedient to hold 
out a large reserve. B0 sfeould distribute his reserves in accord- 
ance with their probt^Ie employ ment^to support an attack, to 
exploit fiuccwi tftpiwiong the Une, to protect a flank, or to cover 

82. Conduct of the attack.— The attack, strongly supported 
by fire and protoeted on its flanks, is launched opposite tiie 
objective. The infantry move.i 10 the attack ftt *,»»et hour or 
upon a prearranged signal, and generaUy by.BlreoeBsive stages. In 
the act of engaging the enemy, the ialsiltry takes full advantage 
of the ground. Its adv^ni^diould be jWMifti^ f0r and supported 
by fire; and it should have *afwe,liaiscra wij^.tfae: artillery, which 
should be prep^ to render effective euppert.. Wlien a rolling 
barrage is u^, the infantry foUows as closely as possible to the 
bursts of the projeetUes. It operates In close contact with the 
tanks. The infantry forms its assault echelon in thin Ungs, a 
distance from the enemy, to avoid losses, and^ ajt t*ie ^am Mim 
to take advantage of its Hre power. , . , 

Aviation should report the position of our.owavaindltoenHB^'B 
front lines and of the enemy batteries ai^ ifeegs,(}pi9aatratioiJ8j 
It should obtain information of e^i^y laovementa in^rear areas; 
it should insure the liaison of the troops engaged, both with the 
division comnKM*dep«!n;d<wiOi the Mtillery. 

The attack advances from point to point, H'ithout alignment oa 
neighboring attacks and with the sole oljject of attaining the final 
objective. Contact groujjs or combat pairols protect the flanks 
and observe the progress of adj;ieent divisions. All commanders 
arerespon.sii.le for the maintenaiice of lateral. communications. 

The dii'ision commauder regulates the movements of the 
divisioii rc.-frve and azures Its entry into action in time tp 
guarantee continuity of effort. mid-.S9«yent tiio enemy from 
regaining lost grotmd. .-- , 

Asmon a«'^'i« expedient,, the; division commander advances the 
waUeiyby Mfeelon so as to give the infantry effective, constant 
•support. Division engineers must be at hand to facilitate its 
movement. The decrease in the number of Ijatteries able to fire 
will usually require that the infantry be supported by concentra- 
tions laid dow n upon its request. Howit/ers with the divMqnsJ 
artillery art- generaily used to extend the action of tiifi 
calibers over as deep a zone as possible, They Are upon groui^ 
favorable to the enemy, upon transjent targets, and upon 
enemy t^nrm toamag for a counterattack or starting one. 
Wb»yiS&mt=m.^^^ bs blinding probable enemy observation 

posto. Whenever, during the action, the division commaBder 
becomes uncertain of the exact situation of the infantry he should 
develop protectiife fire to the maximum. 

The infantry ebhvid employ its m.^simum fir<' jjower. It 
Bhoald coordinate the use of all its weapozis in pn-[>aring and 
accompanying the attack, protecting tianks, assiBting in the 
repulse of co«hterattacl», and occupying conquered terrain. It 
aclvimers its weapone by echejoo t6faffli!ttitoi*J» consito^Bop- 
port of the Jissaulting tr6op«. . , i ,■ . 0" 

The ('oordi nation of artiliory fire with infantry movement 18 
essential to success. It is often secured at the beginning of the 
attack by a time schedule, but dopciids thert;affer upon the 
proper functioning of Uaison between the infantry and the artil- 
lery. Liaison m obtained by placing the command post of the 
attUtey brigade oommander close to that of the division com- 
teiatdSn tWdby plfil«^g the oommaild posts of artillery unite near 
ajgSe the infeafey groups they are to eupport. In addition 
each artillery unit sends to lt« supported infKitry organisation 
a liaison officer and detachment. This liaison detachment keeps 
the artillery informed of the situation and needg of the infants, 
anri advises the infantry about the support to be obtained from 
the artillery. 

AU commanders take advantage of darkaeBS tffl rectify the dis- 
positions at the end of the day, to reform, supply, or r^^lieve units 
engaged, to orgamae the conquered positions, and to reuHtabhsh 
andtmptdve cftmiBrarfcatitflse. They also cross ground dangerous 
to pasa over by day, eostf^ placefcheii troapsin an adv8»*ie«nM 
position to continue the offensive In ittie inorning. 

83. Attack against an enemy in poaltion-^peoial dis- 
p(;>itions arc necessary far an attack against a thoroughly 
organ ize.l po.sitioti. In marching as^^inst an enemy in position, 
the danger af amlmscade is greater {ban in a nu^t-ting engage- 
ment, and tlie enemy u il) already have taken possession of ground 
*Mch he wishes to hold; the advance guard should tlifiroforc be 
r^tively emaU. When the division commander is confronted by 
a |)CiSitiOn which is prepared for a stubborn defense, ho should 
establsh the division firmly upon a ftont layprable for deploy- 
ment and make his dispositions for ;att*6k; B,^OTeitlie^att««k, 
hd ijartiUns accurate Information fjsoin wWoh he jweparer-a -P«>' 
getim toT the artillery and determines' definitely. Ito'iaftlitory 
Ot^tiTes. 'I'll ohiiiin it, he ordisrs active afld ^thorough ground 
Shd ^reconnaiKsance, and may order rttidftWSnaaU local attacks 

toibe made of the enemy positiou and its surroum liners. On these 
sketches are eh own enoniy defensive organ iz,<itions, niaehine-gun 
■positions, and artillery emplacements, the assembly points of 
reserves, communicationa, paths, and covered ways. 

In addition to obtaining aocumte iieformation of the enemy;' 
the division commander must provide for careful organization 
of the attacking force, the placing of ootumand and obsisrvation 
posts, plans for the extension o^ ^oHtmusications, strict regulation 
Uld^.sereening of traffic, the construction of battery positions 
weU forward, the accumulation nf (he necessary supplies, fn- 
eluding ammunition, engineer, medical, and food supplies, and 
the improvement of the road net. 

Minor operations may be required to capture ground in front 
of the main enemy position and to insure for the attack^- the 
possession of important key points of the terrain. These opera- 
tions are, in general, attacks with limited obgectives, the succcm 
of which depends chiefly on staprfss. They laay leqtdre artllleiy 
and airplanes to open the'vmy fittf this Infaiifr? and protect tt 
during the occupation of conquered terrain. During these opei^' 
ations, artillery and machine-gun protective fire may box In the' 
defenders from tlie rear to cut them off from ireinforoement and 
prevent their retreat. 

Before the attack all unit commanders take every precaution 
to insure surprise. The greatest caution is necessary against 
observation from enemy aircraft. Wojtbk constructed and 
movements are made at night. All indiiiatiofts of 'the approach- 
ing attack and all conc^tixattcmd 6f lardrops are concealed, and the 
normal rate of daynght olfWflattoa is ihaintahi^. Balloons and 
^^lanes Immediately *§pdrfVf6Iations of the orders for con- 
cealment. During the nifjlit . Iialloons waleh for fires and lights. 

The division commander issues orders suiEciently detailed to 
contain all Jii'n ^- .iry information for the preparation and execu- 
tion of the atLiifik. 

The division commander controls the action of his artillery 
throughout the combat. Before the attack, he uses it to destroy 
ab.stacles, to overcome the enemy fire power, and to prepare 
for the infantry advance.^' During the attack, he uses artillery 
to support ;tho viitfaetiy b^-' OT^owering the resistance en- 
countered, and to Boreen it .by smoke from enemy observation 
and distant fire. The division artillery may be called upon to 
execute interdiction and counterbattery fire both before and' 
during the attack. , . , j 

The purpose of all fire is to support tlie infantry. The fi^ ol ' 
supporting artillery is in general directed upon those elementB 
of th(3 enemy which, at the lime, are most dangerous to the 
infantry. It assists the infantry in reaching the enemy before 
he o»n make eflective use of his weapons. Supporting fire 
vaiim MGoidtag to the infiui^ maneuver. It conforms to 
the enemjr ground 'SSEg^siN^nii^^ i^^ ^^^^ 
either the form of mi^i>6{iM')^4«eBsen.ii^iona ^ roUiBg .haxrages. 
Succeasive ooiMseittFatiosiB: iWi^ bombardateoto i updB seteoted > 
points. They malpt^|]^ until the progress of the attack i 
demands the tengthet^tog of the range; whereupon they are ' 
raiii«il and placed on more distant points in accordance with a 
prearranged plan. Rolling barrages are dense, deijp curtains of 
fire moving according to a time schedule. Tlie infiinti'y foUows 
thera as closely as possible. The artillery must take care that 
the barrage does -not run away from the infantry. 

The artillegty, pr^ppxi^itcm C'cp^le^ vioteat bosMawdment. 
It may last from a few minute to.8fty«x»l hears^ dsisation 
of the preparation depends upon the rf>Biatem«e to be overtifome, i 
the condition of the enemy, the availability of tanks, and the 
amount of ammunition at hand. Fire is laid chiefly upon tho 
enemy infantry positions and acvcssory tliifenses. If it is iui- 
pos.?ible to determine these exactly, tlie ariillery nriy ^lill pre- 
pare the attack by firing upon objectives to be carried, upon 
tjprain features favorable to the enemy, upon pFohable^sBembly I 
PQi{(ta4or his reserves, and upon his batteriea. I 
^y^h^ auxprlse is especiaUy desired, when suf&eient tenkft are t, 
af^i^iilable, or when the enemy is already shaken and poorly 
prpteoted by obstacles, the preparation may be short or may 
even be omitted. 

Successive concentrations are more flexible than rolling 
barrages and are better adapted to meeting changes in the 
situation. They permit more freedom of infantry maneuver. 
As a ii.ik- tlioy require less ammunition and fewer guns than do 
rolling b;ir rages. The rolling barrage, to be efficient, must be 
dense and deep. An effective rolling barraga requires one 
76-millimeter battery tor each 100 yards of front. If possible, 
the barrage ahoi^ be thickened and deepened b^^ BmajEe, shrap- 
nel, and concentrations from heavier art^Uei^. It should be i 
supi:ilemented by the fire of infantry weapons. The rolling ' 
barrage finds its greatest application in supporting penetrations 
through defensive aones and in overcoming enemy resistance in 

the beginning of &a attack. The employment of a rolling 
barrage pre?iup|ioses an adequate supply of ammunition. 

Communiealion is carried on by the telephone, tolegja^h, 
radio, messengers, visual signals, airplanes, and pigeons. 

During the attack on a thorouglily organized position, fee 
coordination of artillery fire with the advaoee of the infantry 
is generally maintained by s time schedule. These schedules are, 
however, dififieult to carry out when the attack is extended or 
long protracted. In order to coordinate properly the progression 
of the artillery fire with the ii! fun f ry jidvance, it is necessary to 
allow the infantry suflieient time in wliicli to overcome the diffi- 
culties impiMxl by tluf enemy and the .-ic-i.lfnts of the terrain. 
It is somrliiiiLs di-siral^lf, therefore, to arrange for halts on sue- 
cessive iiiii- l iiese lines should be definite, easy of recognition, 
and favorable to the resumption, of the advance. In addition, 
it is well to prescribe a few 'simple ijonventions based upon the 
employment of rockets, airplanes, or radio, which will permit 
the attacking troops to request neoea-mry modifications of the 
time: schedule. 

84. Bepulse. — Should the attack fail, the infantry holds the 
ground gained untU a fresh attack is launched or until ! he success 
of neigli boring units permits the resumption of the advance. It 
organizes its fire system lui;. I.''. :is possible,digs in on a defen- 
sible hue, and marks out its front line to indicate to the araatjii>n 
its exact position. The artflleiy Adjusts Ito'prftteoShre'attKi cowa?! 
$$^pr^aration fite. The attock resumea «ther npon this ord^ 
{rf h^er authority or upon the initiative of the local commander; 
Before a commander renews an attack that has failrd, he should 
determine the principal reasons for Its failure. He may then or- 
ganize the new attack under f;ivo!;tble eomlif ions. If the division 
is ordered to retire, it w ittulraws, as has been previously indicated 
in this manual. 

85. Exploitation of success. — Aviation and subordinate 
coniniaiidcr." iintst keep the division commands eontjlnuonsiy 
informed of the progress of assaulting troops an thufe ttj^-n^ 
adjust his plans and tslce advantage of every oppo4im^?:L>>>'ii 

When he has accomplished his first task, he shouljd «II«Hr<li^ 
enemy no respite. The division should push on vigorously to a 
rapid and successful completion of Ii» mission. This mission 
may be the capture of a distant position, the exploitation of 
success, or (he pursuit of the enemy. As long as the final ob- 
jective has not been attained, every success should be exploitcid 

Important fo!low-vip ranneuvors which can be foreseen find should 
dispose combat units accordingly 

Special preparations are necessary to clean up the eneni> '.^ 
trenches. The work must not delay the advance unduly. Unit 
eomnssad'exB, therefore, designate detaehments for this duty in 
i^faiiiie^ Ksd piroytde tbem with apeoiat weapons. Since this 
d^^buiMijir of 'trooj^'dimfii^ grotiud whiob & tinit 

may cxoe^im^ oommflnders mtfst tske Jt-iato -coniildera^n in 
providing for reliefs and passages of Hrt'^. 

The advuntr contintics by Kut'ccssivo stages until the final 
objective (jf the fiivisicm is; atlaiiicd. The division comnnander 
insures lliat t!n:- urlillcry is coustanlly prepared to siipprirt tht- 
infantry. He cau:^^^ l.lie engineers to repair the roads nuccssary 
to advance the art il lory and to bring up Bupplies. 

A sucoeftt may be followed up either in breadth or in depth. 
If a penetration haa^aefieeded/'ftOBtal ind flank attacks against 
the «neni7 linbi irhieie the penetfatton «)«(!tsn will widen the 
breach. A continued push to the front with fisafs cowrSdv but 
without rf;K:i!-d to the alignment with units which have been 
uhockcd. will incronj^t' the eucccbb and will be the best way to 
lu'lp ni'ifihboriiig units. If the leading troops arc still in fighting 
condition, the duty of exploitation will fall to them. Heavy 
losses may make it necessary to keep them in the conqueied 
position, to organize it, and then pass to the reserve. Rcinf orce- 
ia»itta of fresh units will meanwhile continue the exploitation. 
"*Th8'<Uvtsion.eonutiander must exploit his sueoese to the full. 
Whien bQ again eorcount^ the enemy in poeitSon, hte must pre- 
pare a new attack. He may undeTtaice thia^ attack with the 
troops which captured the first position, or he may delay it until 
he can make new dispositions and engage frcfih troops, lie, 
therefore, arranges reliefs and passages of lines, so as to isolif the 
captured ground and avoid losses due to temporary cone;estion. 

Wlien the defeated enemy abandons the struggle and retires in 
dleordeic the pursuit begiM. It should be uninterrupted, iiold, 
and relbatlese. It is begun by the leading troops. The most 
mobile elements, eueb <^V{dry, meehftti^tifed, motorized, or 
BD&nal-^awn unltSi aud infantryiiii «(Mi#tion to exeeuta ftatsed 
marches, endeavor to cut off the retreat. -iviatkin TeoiafiiHsiters 
the advance and attacks the retreating''enelay^O«luinniS. 'The 
division commander orgjmi/c.s advance giiards Well supplied With 
■artiUciry and provided with fast tanks. The dniy of these ad- 
vance guaxdii is to outflank quickly such local resistance as the 

himself in favoeraMft JOe^tiea, The m^ body forms mto col- 
umns and follows, prepared to intervene in the action. The pur- 
suit sliouid be continued, day md td^bt, to the utmost limit of 
endurance of man and beast. 

Sbctjon hi 

the infantry division in defensive battle 

86, Defense in a meeting engagement. — In a meeting en- 
gagement in which t!;e ilefense is imposed, the division com- 
mander deploys his division in its designated zone cf actior and 
maintains close communication with the divisions on his right 
and left. He supports and reinforces his advance elements in 
conformity with the general directions of the corps, gives the 
necessary orders for the occupation of the battle position and the 
disposition of his reserve, assigns positions and missions to his 
artillery, u.^ics his aviation and all other means to obtain infor- 
mation of the enemy, and keeps his corps commander fully 
informed of the of events. 

87. The battle position. — When a division commander re- 
ceives orders to take up a defensive position, he should rapidly 
reconaoiter the ground, occupy an outpost position with covering 
troops, and dispose his forces to meet an immediate attack. He 
should place them in the battle position, so that they may pro- 
ceed with the organization of the ground without unnetiessary 
delay. He prescribes In more dei^H the line of resistance desig- 
n'aied by the corps commander. He completes and makes neces- 
sary rectifications of his first dispi")sitir)nK, formulates his plan of 
defense, and promulgates it in field orders. These orders follow 
the usual form for the preparation and occupation of a defensive 
position, with annexes as detailed as time permits. The readi- 
ness with which subordinate units make a skillftil use of the^ 
ground is one of the severest tests that can be applied to thg 
division commander. 

The battle position is the place where the dlvisioti conducts its 
main defense. It is bounded in front by the mtun line of resist- 
ance, and in rear liythe regimental reserve line It is a •/.one, of 
continuous, coordinated fire of all weapons which the division 
commander interposes between the enemy and the points of oh- 
eervation that are essential to the effective use of the artillery 
of the defense^ It & at this p'd^tioii'thi(£ the enemy must be 


8& .j£m^SMm:mBmmismsmimetmmmmmmB 

It %t ovganked in suoceaslTO Ifaset^'of mutually supporting 
Btrong points garrisoned, in order from front to rear, by front- 
line platoons and by company, battalion, and regifflenliil reserves, 
for which it should afford suitable cover. For the exercise of 
commasd and coordination of def^iae, strong points ore combined 
into centers of resistance under control of battalion commanders. 
The depth of the position is as great as will permit the rearmost 
elements to eoojjerate, by lire, in defense of the main line of resist- 
ance, and is liiiiittt! only by the range of infantry weapons and 
•topoBrapliiiriit liiiii! ;i( iun?^ to their eraploynienl Tlie brtitle 
position should aiVur.i favorable ground for the emploj^meiit of 
(urtillery fire and natural ad,yiwia|^ liPl' ,b|pckli)g:#is^i|\Sltd the 
progress o^ enemy tanks. 

The main line of resistance is the most important element of 
the battle position. It is the line in front of which the fire of all 
elements of the defense is concentrated to break up the enemy 
attack. It is organi£ejd|^^^^^|bermined resistance and is protected 
by obstacles as continuous as possible Its general location con- 
forms to limiting puintu prcsi ribed by tlit> trorps cnniniaiider, or, 
wlicn not controlled by higher authority, to the defensive mis- 
sion of the diviMijn, to governhig topographical conditions, and 
to the necessity of adequate protection for terrain features vital 
MMdiM^mBe. Its detailed trace is dictated by the conforma- 
tion of the ground and the coordination of fire and obstacles. It 
must possess a, good field of fire at close and medium ranges, and 
lend itself to the flanking protection of automatic weapons 
Every effort wiU be made to keep the enemy from identifying it 
as the main line of resistance and tg. conceal the>.4etoils of its 

To gain concealment from ground observation, thrreby making 
it difliciilt for the enemy to coordinate his infantry and artiUery 
in assault, and in order to preserve the depth of the battle posi- 
tion and coordination of tim. fire of its successive elements, it naay 
be advantageous to place parts of the main line of resistance on 
rear slopes. If such emplacement is selected, covering detach- 
ments, with machine guns and automatic weapons, must be ad- 
vanced to the crest in order to fire on attacking troops during 
their approach to the battle position. Infantry eommander.s 
■ must keep supporting artillery infonucd, ;it all tiniL^s, of the where- 
abouts of their most advanced troops. Special provision must 
be made to |^ !Bi^jQ^si^j j^, y$^ (^^ 
approacbea. , 

The regimental reserve line is the last organized defense of tl» 
vital terrain features which it is the function of the battle posi- 
tion to cover. It marks the forward limit of the emplacement of 
artillery other than antitank guns and units advanced to support 
the outpost. The logical Une of its trace is an unportant. and, at 
times, a controlling consideration in the selection of the mam 
Une of resistance. The regimental reservftviine murt permit o 
fire in support of the main Une of resiatano*, serve as » bne o£ 
departure for counterattack, and afford » podtl^i fcir»«tH^TO 
resistance as a iinal )iii<- of defense. These.requlremeatefttebest 
met by a skillful combination of positions onforward and reverse 

8S Reserves.— AU reserves are placed where they may be 
readily available to reinforce the line of resisUnce or to counter- 
attack. Counterattack is the decisive, offensive element of 
defenslTO atetioifc If -it Mls Bind l&e enemy maintains himself in 
the interior of the position, the reserves will form the first element^ 
of aholcHng line to oontrin the enemy until he can be expelipd 
by counterattasks of greater magnitude by -.tto^pe :l«P«8i>t W 
for the purpose. 

8© The outpost position.— The battle position should be 
covered by an outpost position, at a sufficient distance f«™ 
Une of resistance, to give timely warniuf;, to protect it from the tire 
Of long-range infarrtty weapons, and to break up the cohesion of 
the enemy attacfe In lw^forcea this distance should he such as 
to require the enemy Wiiis^ace forward, bis light artiUery before 
he can launch a ooor*Hiart*^'«aiS** oa battle positioa. K 
time perndts, a delaying between tbe.t»TO,pi^ 
be organized. 

The outpost position should have all the merits of the main 
battle position; it should be organized on the same principles to 
the end that it may, at the discretion of division and hiiiher com- 
manders, be used as an alternative main Hne of resistance. I he 
smaU forces assigned to it wiU, generaUy, in the early stages of 
Its uMupation, be unable to; prepare extensive works. It should 
be protected by a part of thB*riBioa araHery, m& emplaceiotmts 
should be prepared so that aU the artillery; nwy-^se used for this 
purpose. The rear of the outpost porittoadlOiad:be.00TO»a 
fire from the battle position. When the division taJies up *-poBl- 
tion in the face of an enemy already upon the ground, or wlieftlt 
assumes a defensive position in an interval between o4EMirtve 
ojwratlons, the line of reastanoe of the outpost poeitioo abom 

be the first good line of resistance that can be foimd olose to the 
enemy's outpost position. 

60. Organization of tile ground.— Organization of the 
ground couBiete in artificial strengthening of the; positioo. It ia 
carried on progressively. Of prime importBSQC^;^ coiatwt em- 
plaoementia for the l^oops and (or theH weapoBB, the CQnetrua- 
SoU of abaifcutles, provi^oas for attaiRmg tupMor observation 
mS field of fire, and the iaataJlation of adequate signal com- 
ilttmicattoiis. . The flghtirig power of the troops should be in- 
eteased and their strength conserved hy further iinrt iicliun iit, 
by the use of camouflage, by constructing shelters and dummy 
works, and by improving communications. 

All the ground immediately in front of the line of resistance 
should be covered by the coordinated fire of all infantry weapons, 
in concealed positions, sheltered and echeloned at varying dis- 
tMitiAB. Althottgfa a danae^ id^e Une mudt be a'srofded, ooml>at 
pio^ muet not be so teitlaiied tb&i^e epaoe between them ie 
tesaffiiStentty gaarieiL Infilteatloft be*ween combat posts under 
cover d dflrkHMSi'f^t ot KEtkofe^ mnet he. pre van tod 

Obstacles should hold the enemy under the flanking fire of 
automatic weapons and prevent a sudden irruption into the front 
line of defense. 

ff the ground permits the enemy to use tanks, antitank defense 
must be provided by lip;ht guns and infantry yre&pom in tpjrwaxd 
positions; and mine fields and ditches should be eonflti^actsd. 
They should be concealed from en^y obiervatioa. 

Comfnend p^te are wtablidted; signal communications are 
completed and -given proteotion; roads, paths, and l'viih;t s nre 
oonamicted and repaired; and shelter is provided and in-ij roved. 

*1. Conabat dlspoaitlona.— For battle, the division com- 
'Ittander divides his command into echelons which comprise re- 
spectively the troops occupy ing the battle position, the outpost 
difctachm e n ts . t ht: ar 1 i 1 Ic ry , a II d t h e d i V i sio n reaer ves , The greater 
part of tlie inf.intry occupies the battle position. In rear CriE tbe 
front line, units are echeloned in depth so that they may readily 
reinforce the line of rcfsfstanoe; Stop Hie en^y penetration by 
fire pO^^ or r^Ksl It by cotmterattaelE. Outpoet detachments 
are''lttdited tD'sMct neceasities and are generally detailed from 
titOOps occupying the battle position. Tlieir combat positions 
art chosen so as to permit thom to develop their maximum 
fire po^ver. As in the olFenriive, tiit- division commander deter- 
mines the missions of the artillery, and aasigng jt.thq geoeral,AH^ 
tobe oeogpi«d Itia eispJieediH^ thiKtlt ieam e^ 

to the battle position and SOin^iffiltrate the nias.H nf itn fire on B|ijjHll 
most favoraljle to enemy advance. It is echeloned in depth ftb 
that some batteries may support tiic outpost position and others 
may fire upon the interior of the battle position. Ail batteries 
should be prepared for close-in defense. Tb% WeiXBxaj Mgader 
commander forms the groups and allots mission., poidtions, and' 
observation poste. dJr^tiS the artillery tunmunition supply. 

The division reserves consist of the unengaged Infantry, the 
tanks, and, when necessary, the engineers. According to cir- 
cumstances the reserves are echeloned for protective purposes 
behind the exposed; or held in a ]iosition from which they 
may deliver a [>ri'p:ired counteratt ;ick (iftuiiist the flank of an 
enemy attack which !ms penetrated or which threatens to break 
through the battle position; or disposed 80 l^t tliey^ SCtfty 1i<^e 
up the counterofiensive. The larger tiie leaaeve ihe imore'taQhiUw 
and actfcv^e is the d^sNnae. fdr an ag^prsMi^ iitt«B^bn.<t&1^ 
brigade may be held in leserve, so disposed to 'fii6ill6ite «ait^ 
terofiensive aclton by the entire command. ■ 

93, Coiaduct of the battle. — When attaclc is not imminent, 
troops destined for the battle position are placed in or near it, 
so that they may work upon it without unneccssriry fatigue. 
When attack is imminent, they occupy their conil>at positions. 

The division commander instructs the outpost troops either to 
hold their position, or to conduct a delaying action in withdrawing 
to Uie battle position. The artillery covers the approaches to the 
outpost poieitioh and the intervals between strong points, tf tiie 
outpost troops are instructed to fall back, they retire under the 
division commander's prearranged plan which should specify the 
time of withdrawal and the routes to be followed. This pro- 
cedure will ermble the artillery to protect their withdrawal. The 
withdrawal should not mask the fire of the main position. 

The primary mission of the division commander is to hold the 
battle position. Throughout the action he influences the battle 
by his control over the Are of his artillery and the use of his re- 
serves. Fire action is an eaaential element of t&e defense. Se. 
secures tfab eoKximum ate pow<^ b«^tii& )6odrdiBtttljon of liik li>AKtt- 
try and artillery fire: He prepares a plan for this purpose; 
Infantry automatic weapons cover the position by continuous 
bands Of fire; Artillery lire is laid in advance of the infantry fire 
or reinforces it on critical points. The efficiency of fire action 
depends chiefly upon gonti observjii in:>, ,1 uo^ii fii-ld of iire, the 
absence of enemy interference, elticient communications, exact 

coordination, and proper liaison. When attack in imminent, the 
diviaipn commander, in accordance witli orders from the corps 
comma n tier, orders counterpreparation and interdiction firt' by 
his artillery, Ue ni&y ateqt. ^d$;^ Qount^rbiliritvcj 14&chiiie 
guns and iBfwQtrjt miaim:msff tdA ^ <xm3^1mWBpBxa,iSicm and 

As soon as an enemy attack la launched, the artillery and infan- 
try endeavor to break it up. Their fire is closcl)" coordinated 
and supplementary. The division plan must be sucli that it will 
assure this coordination almost automatically. Infantry fire 
eliould be deii.-ie on areas iens readily covered by the artillery. 
Artillery fire siiould bar access to grouiui wliich infantry fire, 
because of the flfttness of its trajectory, can not so easily protect 

The primary targete oi the division artillery are the aBsanli 
sehelons. If the attack leaqhes the friendly infantry, the 
sietiUery transfers Its fire to the enemy auppoits. If the enemy 
secures a foothold in the battle position, the infantry and artUlery 
must limit his progress and isolate him from his reserves by a 
continuous wall of fire around the 

Maintenance of tlu; integrity of the liaftle position is the func- 
tion of front-hne brigades. If flic eucniy succeed in penetrating 
beyond the main line of resistance, it is the mission of brigade 
commattd^^fti with means at their disposal, tf> eject him main- 
tain <^bMnmty ^ diaf^sus i^tbla J^. battle; position. 

Local <iQiuit^Mt««](S' iH^e made by b^talktn; regimental, si|d 
brigade jje^ervea. They should be foreseen and thoroughly 

Until brigade reserves have been exhausted and the regimental 
reserve Une is in jeopardy of rupture, tiic eciployment of the 
division reserve is, as a rule, unwarranted. As soon, ho\vc\ (:r, as 
it becomes evident that troops under brigade control wUl be unable 
to prevent penetration bej ond the limits of the battle position, 
the division commander, with all means at his command, should 
counterattack to restore its integrity and drive the enemy beyond 
the main line of resistance, {n view of the destructive power and 
demoralieing influence of enemy tanks and their abOity to pene- 
trate deep into fortified areas, the division commander should 
be prepared at all times, with means under his immediate control, | 
to destroy such tanks as may break throutjh ilu; reRimental 
reserve line or threaten to penetrate beyond the battle pusilion. 

Countt'Tii-ttack is the soul of defense. A countcisittack by the 
division reserves ahQuld be suppor^d by all available artillery 

and may or may not be prcr-eded by an artillery preparation. 
The division commander designates the troops, dcteiniines the 
direction and object of the attack, the line of departure, the 
amount of the artillery supj^rt, and, Jf necessary, the time of 
attack He may request assistance £rom the corps artillery or 
from neighboring divisions. Asa rule, he orders counterattack*! 
against the flanks of a salient, with such limited objectives as will 
render untenable, to the enemy, the ground which he has captured 
within the defensive position. 

93. Defetiao in a stabilized situation. — A front may become 
stabilized. The position will include protected, ivell-hidfien bat- 
tery and machine-guo positions, emplacomeiils for infaiitry can- 
non, undergi^uod signal communication, intricate and formida- 
ble obstaoteiSi in«)rq^!(:ed cowao'Mieationa.i ,and, eixopg ; eheljNw^ 
reinforced by aFmpr plate and concrete- 

The strength of the defensive worits will hifluenoe the m«nne(T 
of occupying and defending the position. The division com- 
mandE:r should fully develop the defense plan. It should contain 
iiistruttions governing the manner of ofi'uiiying the posifion 
during quiet periods and in attack, as \\t;ll as provisions for 
withdrawal or reinforcement. By freiiut-nt drills the troops 
should be. pjw^tieed in tlie duties devolving upon tliemiu attack. 

To avQid prematurely revealing the positions of batteries, 
machine guns, and Loijantcy^ .qjjmon, the gttftter pert pf the 
artillery and of the Cntoalaty aasQkn'y weapons will I'^nito 
silent until an attack is actually launched. Such firing, as ^sai^^ 
be required before the day of battle will be done by a few bat- 
teries of mobile weapons using improvised emplacements, which 
sliould ho constantly changed. The conduct of the battle fallows 
the principles previously set forth. Good signal communi- 
cation and the strength and number of shelters make it easier, 
at the outset, to carry out the plans of defense. 

94. Action: in an enemy withdrawal. — The enemy may 
voluntarily withdraw from a stabilized position. At the first 
indications, his intentions should be verified by aerial recon- 
naissance and deep raids. When the retirement begins, the enemy 
musl tii' folUiufd closely to disorganize his retreat and prevent 
him from complying demolitions. Precautions should be ob- 
served agfiinst olTensive rt turns Through aviation reports of the 
extent of the devastated urea, the depth of the evacuation may be 
estimated. The division should maintain close contact wtth the 
«temy, and advance from one good position to another. 

95. Withdrawal'' it«b!ta/<M?Hon- — Whi^ji it !s isecfiswy (o 
withdraw, or when the dlvlslCiB commander receives an order to 
disengage his forces and fall back, he' forma a rear guard and 
supports it vt'itii all available artiUetT- The rear guard takes 
poEition on the line designated by the corps commander ^ and 
gn^DB eoniaak with the t&ti guards of tis^giibcalng divMoDS. 

vttitdraval by daylight u bo eostliy^st iiotdll be'undertakeo 
liidy ^bea tta seiiessity te so vital as to warrant the sacrifice 
that it win entail. When it becomes imperative, the division 
eonimaiider will withdraw liis eommimd under the protection of 
covering troops on the Hue, heavily rotti forced by machine guns. 
He should attempt to regain liberty of action by forming a rear 
guard. He will indicate the direction of retreat, assign assembly 
pointB and roads, and specify the major demolitions to be 
executed, in conformity witb ordere from the corps commander. 
The rear guard withdraws when It bas accomplidied ita('ialKsi<»i(. 

86. I>eUi^i^ ftbti<m. — -The division commander will execute 
sncb d^j^fitii^'^cGfitioti as is requin/d by the situation or orders 
from h^lie(r'au^i0Cit!f. He will occupy with infantry, heavily 
reinforced by artillery and machine guns, succe^ive positions 
favoml>]e for long-rangcs fire and witlidr.awal under natural cover 
Successive positions should be separated by such distaoces as 
WUl force the enyuiy to displace his artillery before he can launch 
» coordinated attack on the second position. By these means be 
witl compel the enemy to de{»loy aiid 'advance across the country. 
B^ore tb6^ troops becotms stiriduBly engird, «ill witli^^w 
&»m each position and (inmask the position' fn teiar; 

S7, The counterdfiFsasim — ^^^6 t>n the^dtfieiti^%ie|4tt6 divi- 
sion commander must look forward to the time when his diVieion 
will be called upon to take its part in an overwhelming counter- 
offensive He must maintain the fighting spirit and training of 
his troops and the condition of men, animals, and equipment; 
and he must plan tiis operations bo as to be able to pass to the 
ctounteroff^josive with the best chanoefi of auceess 

eicnoii L TSe aivalry oorrjs . (18 

ri ' a-.ra»ea»alry dlTWOB . .. ^ g^^llO 




Section 1 

98. Characteristics and eroployment.— The cavalry corps 
IB a strojig, llcxible organisation, which includes two or more 
cavalry divisions and troops attached for special missions. In- 
fantry, tanks, air units, additional artillery, engineer units, and 
other troops assigned to it should be given maximum mobility. 
Cavalry divisions not assigned to armies form a part of the 
G. H. Q. reserve. Sucli uii;!SKigned divisions may be allotted to 
armies or to groups of nrmtes. or they may be formed into one or 
more cavalry corps. 

As a rule, the corp.'; commander, at the beginning of a cam- 
paign, issues his onlers in the form of iiistrfictions which define 
the mission, but which leave the method of execution to division 
Qdmmanders. In battle he coordinates the action of his divisions, 
determines the employment of nondiviBtonaJ units, and maneu- 
vers and controls the reserves. 

a d^^j in 00 f*e-\ 

I leti'tpura-ri] y irrid^u' vr,i- frr>njT;ia^^iPr Ariivy ef^^^>- 
kiH-f) v-avalry coHiiiiativterh- curretitly irrfoi'f««i-af 
id ioft. — ^b» Ti&valry StKnUd -fafrgiiwt-4h o aant^ ' 


mitr.diT.-. Mill 
.■li^i-.;.- in iA 
definite misaion -Hg: 
siwuid hg ^s w rif as t 
'aB rfna a pa ad ftBto ai Bp a igD of hio ow n. 


Section n 


99, .CharaoteilBtiesir— The eavaii^ di'vifdon is. a large unit of 
great qelerity of moveilMiit. It is the -ba^ grnond orgardsatfon 
for the service of information md smu)^ ei ita Bxmj . It ob- 
tains both positive and negative InformatitiU. It includes combat 

and admitiisti ;»l ive branches essential to make it sclf-suetaining. 
It posse.ssfcs I lie lire power of small arms, machine guns, and artil- 
lery, and it can act independently or as part of other units The 
fire power of a cavalry unit rougilly equals that of the nest 
smaller Infantry organization. Acting alone or with other cavi^^ 
dlvisfcofDSj It.coi^ establish and mlfitoin contact with theen^y 
i^v^ial marchea in advapee pf ,tl% Anny or group of armieaVitfoaii 

60 A MAiridEiifoieft^iaiiMM ANDERS of large units 

avoid eompromiiing engagemeata »nd retain ite liberty of action; 
and it can maintain its line of communloation and supply with it« 
base of operations. 

A cavalry division can march, without undue fatigue, at a 
pace double that of the infantry and maintaiB it for an ex- 
tended period. In an emergency it can cover 125 miles in 48 
hours, with its artillery and machine guns. Wliuti employed 
■continuously on arduous service, cavalry dcttrioratos rapidly in 
Cfefmbat efficiency. Cavalry commandort; and higher commanders 
■ftho are rospousihle for the employment of cavalry units, must 
conserve thy strength of men and horses, and provide adequate 
opportunities for them to rest and recuperate. The facility with 
which cavalry can break off an engagement and take up succes- 
eive pMitions, enables a eing^e cavalry division to retard the 
advance of an attny up6h a wide front. In the movements and 
combinations of movements which precede the contact of masses 
of infantry on great fronts and which are decisive pliascs of 
a campaign, a cavalry division has an independence of action 
which gives it a r61e that can not be played by any other unit 
6* arm of the service. It has its greatest and most indispensable 
usefulness- as a covering unit at the beginning of a campaign 
and, during the campaign, as a strong mobile force capable of 
any' class' (rf actloii. " - 

" "^yjigiJO i eaj e wC Maaploymoiii; — Cavalr j di v isionB oovortbtj 
i a sft t" a i ^ ^tfia«. . Qffe 6-aHi ay , s cre e n it s a dv ance, sAtd nja lae -^l M t aai 

j^^Baif^nee7— Sutiwa^jattt o i the m as e_gf '<!avfllFy4s ^-ept 
^lHtlet to Iiperate as'^' not th o *5R es aj i^^^tnk or reftr, to act as* 

-iw>f>)le rejiervey-of 4o w^ait' tfw^akthiwlgfe -a t_th e e ne my-^toiea- 
Aft e r t) ft ttl e ) itfflay-puT B ue the enemy ■ or -e ovc f tEB'TelL P eat of it - s 
ftwtt-fe rso . -^S^ e tiai efl o ft ¥ ft lry divi a oa a aj » w nploy a d oatM dg; 

101. DiBtant reconuaiBsaiice. — ^Distant reconnalesanoe is 
carried out in aceordeotce with the ihgtroctloaa of higher coia- 
manders. The instructions of :^tlfiE9ay wttmander to the cav- 
alry division cover all pertltiifeiil^ iniorinatjon about the enemy 
forces and the friendly troops, the nli^jf^iolls of the army, the inten- 
tions of the army commander, the mission of the cavalry diviKiori 
expressed in ternw of the inforrnation requirt^d, (h'' :ui':i Ui !)■■ 
covered, and otlier data depending on the mission and tlie 

. Dtai^mt reagB ^ aiaBw seiekB to dteteixaliie tlK arfetus' Of con- 
md^rsment hts xnalii>eAuipjuf; tbe ivroipreae, #B|tai^ width 


of the movemerit; the strenfjth and general composition of each 
column; the wliereabouts of enemy columns ami the general 
contour of the enemy's dispositions; his defensive organization; 
the strength and whereabouts of his general reserves; his supply 
instaUaMons, lines of supply, and activity Moiig Ms lines of 
comamnieaititHii,' . . . 

Ca,miiy and aVifddoii are Specially charged with distaiDtreaoa- 
nalsaance. For efficient results, the combined acMon of the two 
is necessary. The aviation begins the reconnaissance, discoveis 
the main enemy forces, and holds them under observation. The 
information gained by its reconnaissance inriipates the direction 
of advance of the cavalry. Distant aerial rt^ronnaissnnce covers 
broad areas in great depth; many essential details can be. obtained 
only from the contact that results from the ground reconnais- 
sance of the cavalry. An observation squadron is attached to 
the division to extend in depth the: aone under observation by 
rocoimsiBsanoe detachments and to" secure 'the infomationwhldi 
wiU ^ve effective direction to the activity of the<a^ata^'di'vision. 
It assists the division commander In regulating the t^^&Bce :^ 
the dt vision by reporting the whereabouts of the varioutlielementB 
of his command, and by Iransmittinp information between the 
division and its advanced units. 

The army commander assigns to the cavalry division a zone 
of reconnaissance which ordinarily does not exceed 26 to 30 
miles in width. The cavalry diviraon commaader rcc^etributei 
this zone to t^coimalssance dietaohiiiie^lisfTiuf^llas^ 
and costposrticm aocsording to the sn«m]r o|praii^on «s^«^ted 
and the relative importance of their missions. A reeonn&taiaiiee 
detaclimen'i may have a ,srr(>nf;th varyinir from a troop to a 
re(;i[i)e[il-. i ri n tureed in aE;eordanee with the re(i i;i reiiients of it-S 
mission by iiiaehine suns, armored cars, and artillery. The 
division commander bases the distribution of zones of recon- 
naissance detachments upon the road net. He rarely assigns to 
a troop a reconnaissance zone more than 8 nules in width. In 
flank zones, he may indicate only the inner boundaries. 

bi 4istEibuting forces £oc tecon BaisflanM and in aesigiung mlfr- 
sions^ the dMsiosr ocmmaader gives <itiB cofistderatian to the 
points of most decisive importance to the mission of his division. 
He assigns (greater strength and a more aggressive mission to 
detachments operating in decisive zones. In the beginning, when 
the tiiiuation is not clear, he will generally find it advisable to 
diminish tUe strength of reconnaissance detaciiments. The allot- 
ment of too large a proportion of the divisional strength tc 


fi6«WliPKti8CUtee$ Vaults in inadequate support for the Teoonooitei^ 
-log detaohm^E^ aiad reduces the poirer of the division to engage 
in oonibat^ 

The cavalry division commander indicates the general route 

.of the reconnaisBance detachments within his zone of action and 
the liDe that its patrols ;ir*; to reach daily. The distance between 
-the reconnaissance detachments and the main body of the divi- 
-Moa varies with the situation; at times it may become several 
<days' march. The division commander will not hold these 
detachments reeponMble for the security of the division, but wiU 
'detail Uie neeeSBoiy covering forces for its security, 

Beconnaissanoe detachments communicate with the main 
body by radio, mesaengers, or other available means. In enemy 
territory special provisions for the protection of re^y statibna 
may become a duty of the division commander. 

When thu distance between the maiii bodies of the two oijpos- 
ing forces is so reduced that there is no longer room for operation, 
the cav;ilry division withdraws, generally to a flank. The re- 
connaissance detachments either come under control of the corps 
iOr are reheved and join the cavalry division. 

Strategical Teconnaissaoce may be cossideTed as the lOfotnal 
duty of cavalry divisions when em|dc>yed' as armyt cavah^. 
(Whether it should take precedence over counterreconnsissance 
<idepends upon the cavalry etrength and the mission of the army. 
Cavalry action in successful r(;Lo:iiiais3anee usually accomplishes 
The purposes of counterreeon;i;u;vf';uice. 

102, Counterreconnaiasanct). — A cavalry division assigned 
a counterreconnaissauce mission seeks to defeat or neutralize 
enemy ground reconnaissance forces. Before committing itself 
>to an Advance which m^ht tmcoyer its .awti : 4rm?« the cavalry 
ditlsiaa^ 'endeavors : to iearto the position d-ithe «nemy oaV^iy 
whose ^hereaboute determines the diree^on xtf s«dvanee ^d- tl^ 
dispositions of the cavalry division. 

Counterreconnaissance may hti t'ilhor oHensive or defensive, 
A screening mission is most (^iroctivijly aceomplislied by the 
defeat of tlie enemy reconiiaiK-.;>.tn;e fiircta. The disjiositions of 
the division in ofl'ensive counterreconnaissance are similar to 
those prescribed for reconnaissance. Contact detatdiments 
operate aggressively and locate the principal enemy cavalry 
forces to prepssre for the attack of the division. In defensive 
cousterreconnaii^nce, widch is most effective when established 
along a continuous obstacle, patrols are pushed to the front;; and 

<; ..Uii'y - .11,1 >i;'( /itj Td: >:';i. y:-.- u 'jyiiii ..-i , |i' J.:'... 

Htmaktial for commanders of large units 63 

the. dii^bri commander ^£$oses Ids forces tm. a&aUk Jblock tii» 
tasA'a mutsB tiii &pprositSi. ^ ^ m - i in-wriTtifTwri'lb^a 

Cavalry divisions, when screening the concentifaMotl efiMHBlBKli 
usually act defensively. They hold a line far enough to t4iis?flSsi* 

to keep enemy reconnaissfince at a distance from the army, 

103, Offensive combat. — 'I'he dispositions of the cavalry 
division for attack usnaOy include a pivot of maneuver about 
which the command operates, a maneuvering mass cliarged with 
the main .'lUaclt, and a reserve. 

The division commander issues his orders to brigade com- 
n^nders, to the oommandera of artillery, engineers, and special 
troops, and to chiefs of services In battle he cooidinat^ itiii^ 
action of the brigades, directs the employment of the arinUeery, 
Services, and engineers, and disposes of the division ■ reserve- 
He normally employs the division artillery as a part of the pivot 
of maneuver. He designates the troops which constitute the 
pivot and the maneuvering mass and coordinates their efforts. 
His orders cover tbe posting of the fire uniL^, the time of opening 
the fire attack, tha designation of the place to which the maneu- 
vering mttse is to tw^eiliti tod the whereabouts of the reserve. 

As' soon ss ooiitaei''!»iarefieeai the divisioniendeavors to secure 
points of obseiVfttten *aa to deny Sieto'-to tKe sietoy* 

In a meeting enjrfigement,- the advance guard establishes -the. 
pivot of maneuver. In a more deliberately prepared atta<*} » 
special foi-c-i; is detailed to establish it. The pivot of nianeuver 
engages the enemy's uitention and pins him to bis position by a 
fire attack or by a combination of fire attack and manuuver. All 
automatic weapons and artillery that can be spared from the 
maneuvering moBB are a^gned to the pivot, 

Ttie mawieuvering maas ooniauE® the main offensive power and 
t*ten oonstituises the greAtet ptxi ot the division. I^CM^v^on 
commander assigias to ighe le&der Jtf tsyte fradiitHUtiie:*o^3n!igliafct 
inent of the vital offensivfe action and alloivs hteuBufaoient'lIbertsr 
of action to lake full advantage of the developments of the.Situ»4 
l ion. He informs him of the general plan, the mission of; the 
maneuvering mass, and the duties of the other elements of the 
division. He frequently specifies the line of departure of the 
maneuvering mass and the route thereto. He should not dispatch 
the maneuvering mass until he obtains some definite information 
of the enemy's whereaibouts. It is welli however, to eng^e the 
pivot of maneuver early and to dispcfee the mnunder oi tim 
divttiOB'so that Jt sto-Tsadily .op^mte^erbund gtiMikii j a-'u 

The reserve fs kept mounted or clom to its horses. Its strenj^th 
will vary from about one-sixth to otic-third of the command, 
Ita initial location depends upon its contemplated employment. 
Slioulf! the attack of tlie pivot or that of the maneuvering mass 
be riucyussful, the division commander orders up the vTeserve 
pr^irtiplly to occupy the position or to pursue tlie enesos'V When. 
His Qutcome of the attack is iiQubtfoltiie:seads #«i; iei^i[!ine;ittrtij 

104. I>efenslve combat. — Qa^v^ry divisions may be 
employed on ths defensive to seize and hold a position pending 
the arrival of ottie^' forcpB^ :to cover a witlidrawal, to delay the 
enemy's advance, or to fill a gap in t!ie line of battle. 

When operating against cavalry, the cavalry division usually 
adopts the active defense. A purely passive defense would 
compel the division to fight dismounted practically in its en- 
tirety. Isolated dismounted a»tira- (gainst jnounted teoops 
exposes the cununand to the daager e! eaV'CloimieiLt. ' 

106, Defense of a positdoK — The fundfUnental principles 
goverz^.the Seploymmb of the cavalry division are the same 
as thoee preseHbed for the infantry division. Tlie pi an of de- 
fense is inflaenced by the tactical situation and thu terrain. If 
the position is to be held for a limited time only, the defense 
may be passive. The development of defensive dispositions 
depends upon the time available for the organiaation of the 
ground. The supporting artiUer? is general^ . Ttall farward in 
concealed positions that afford' t^spartoMt^ vl^ d!»i9^ IwJng 
with little movement of t^.gons. • - ~ i . , 

In a ha«til7 organised defense t^ainat lastly ydtlc ^t^' or 
no attached cavahy, the cavalry division deploys on a etmpf^' 
tively wide front in mutually supporting groups, with mounted 
reserves held under cover in rear of the firing lines. It holds 
lightly those positions of the Sring Une that have a good field of 
fire. The has little depth, but lack of deptli is balanced 
by the speed with which threatened parts of the line caa be 
rdnforced by the mobOe reserves. Should the eaigxiT fdtce in^ 
elude much cavalry, the division iese(Fve should be . 

In the defense of a fortified position, led horass am held 
immobile weJl In rear of the bactU« Lpo(9{tion. The depth of de- 
t^ymmit b greater than in a hastily organiaed defense, and the 
defense is conducted in accordaaos with the principlea pre- 
scribed for the infantry division. 

106. Covering a withdrawal. — A cavalry division covering 
a withdrawal generally operates ae an independent delaying 

force, inii not confined to the aone of the withdmwit^ force. 
It may either interpose itself between the withdrawing and the 
pursuing forces, or operate from a liatii; against the pursuing 

The commander of a cavalry division detailed to cover a 
wtthdrawal detetlnises in accordance with the ground and the 
tactical situatioa whether he, can best cheek and delay the 
pursuit by occupying successive positions or by flanMng 'the 
enesiy -i advifnee^ sdid whether he can best emiiloy the trtkips 
!n mounted action, in a combination of mounted- and 'fire action, 
or in fire action alone. 

The. cavalry division nurmaliy acts aggretisively in covering 
a v.''awal. It holds out a maneuvering mass to disorganize 
the pursuit iiy action against the flanks of pursuing columns, 
arid to punish overhasty pursuit by counteroiTensive action. 

Tlie operations of the enemy cavalry may determine the dis- 
positions and action of the covering cavalry division. Action by 
the ca%nadry of the pursuing force against the fliuiks amd rear x«f 
the retiring force may requiis the eropldymeitt of aQ of i^e 
friendly cavaby tO oppwe the enemy cavalry. 

107. Delaying actions. — Against infantry, the cavalry 
division should exploit the advantage of its superior mobility. 
Usually it is distributed in two or more semi-independent groups, 
A portion of the division directly oppc«es the head of the enemy 
column, while another portion operates against its flank. 

Against cavalry, the distribution of tho delaying force into 
several semi-independent and widely dispersed groups wOuld 
iBSia&. tW «nctuy ' c^pttrtunity to defeat it in' dei^. Wkm ^^SsM 
enemy to be delayed has aggressive cavalry, the delaying cavalry 
division is kept well In hand. It utiUzcs terrain features whiish 
will not permit the enemy to deploy quickly and u iiich do not 
readily lend themselves to the delivery of a mounted attack. 
Defi le s , woods, a n d vill ages are useful f oT tins purpose. It' holds 
out a strong reserve. 

108. On the flank of tho army in battle.- — The mission Of 
division on the flank of the army in battie may include the 

d^^t ^d puMtit of the enemy cavalry, operatioha again#tri^e 
enehiy'«'fl^ftiik,'ir&ar, iUid. oomitmnications and agatnji hiBieserves, 
recohnaissMide to the front arid flanks, the jiravention of enemy 
reconnaissance, the protection of the flank of the army, the 
pursuit of a defeated enemy, or the covering of tlie withdrawal 
of its own atmy. 

66 A MArrcTAL for commanders of large units 

The most favorable pcisHion for the cavalry division is freQuently 
In advance of the Sank of its owit army. In the offensive, tlio 
flaak to be cliosen is the one where the decision will be sought. 
M tlie defensive, it is the one where it is thouglit tlie entmy 
will seek the decision. Th«: cavalijr diyision selects a position 
in ^M«h it is protected fjrom :1>be \ie% amA Sm Qf %k9 m^mj 
both the air and on the ground and from wMch it can teike 
immediate action. 

109. Exploitiiig a break througli- — The cavalry divifiion 
moves to the vicinity of the main effort of the operation ivhicii is 
expected to brealt tlie enemy's line. Tiie breacii sliould be suf- 
ficiently wide to enable Ihe cavalry division to pass through 
witiuiiit nceiving severe fire from the flanks. The infantry 
should clean it up, especially of machine guns, before the cavsJi'J 
starts through. . 

In passing thiQttgJi the . bi«aoh, tbe division selects routes near 
tii» BietUSin iiite^j practicable from enemy 

artiUeTy and machine-gun fiie. The mission assigned the division 
on clearing the breach conforms to the general plan of esploita- 
tion. This mission is clear-cut, aggressive, and should be relent^ 
lessly carried out. 

110. Pursuit. — The cavalry (!ivi.5ioii fldvaiices .ilotig roads 
parallel to the enemy's line of retreat, delivers repeated attaclis 
against his flank, carries out destructions onM» Vm of retreat, 
Attacks convojSi mi iatterapte to be^^ t^ie'fg(BS)TO. to defiles, 
fi^ges, dtih^eri^ ., i , 
^:!^3l^f^!be^JI^lk oppOBidg forces are separated by sufficient 
cUMaBicSa: the division is usually divided into three parts, which 
conduct, respectively, the direct, flank, and parrillpl pursiats. 
The force detailed to conduct the direct pui>iiii is generally 
.small. The direct and iiank pursuits deal with thv t;!:( iiiy's rear 
guards. The parallel pursuit seeks to strike the enemy's main 
columns, dislocate his dispositions, and delay his retreat. The 
division commander be on his guard against dispersion of 


Tlie cavalry division, in pursuit, will generally operate beyond 
(fuppo;^ ol other troops under conditions which render com- 
munication with higher headquarters difficult and often impos- 
sible. It sacrifices, for the time being, its line of communications 
and depends upon such supplies as it can carry without loss of 
mobility and obtaui: by requiaition or purchase. In the rapidly 
ch&nging^uatlon, l^e #n«w>n c<Hm(napdet mu^^^fj^i^p^^^i^e^ 


initiative in conformity with Ids mission and the plan of the 
army oommander. 

; . . ■ 1 Chapter 9 ^ j ■ , 



Secttom I. ElTM lines , lll-m 

n. Woods and villagM _i U*-I1B 

m. Moimtala country — llT-118 

IV. During periods ol limited vision 119-121 

V. Coast defense . — — . 123-127 

,. _ Bectiq?! 1 


111, Oeneral. — The heights on the near side of many rivers 
constitute natural lines of defense, the river valleys form excel- 
lent fields of fire, and the rivers themselves constituto obstacles 
to attack. Likewise the heights on the far side of many rivers 

are natural lines of defense, and the valleys afford covered 
groiiiid and cxcollent lateral commnnicatiun in rear of the lines 
of resistance. Unless rivers are very wide, or the heights on 
the near side are close to the elrcam, rivers are not good lines of 
resistance. Usually tii« h^hts count for everything and the 
riv^ for lijbtle, except af an obstacle and a cjear field of fire in 
front^f a good line of resistait<^. 

112. Attack.~In approaching a river, a commander should 
seize the crossings and the heights beyond the river, by sending 
forward Ids cavalry, witli f>ji£;ineers and infantry in motor trucks. 
If the enemy has occupied a defensive line on the near side, the 
problem of crossing does nol arise until he lins been driven beyond 
the river. If he occupies a defensive position on the farther side, 
the conimander should undertake operations on a wide front and 
make demonstrations at varipus points on the river in order to 
deceive thiB enemy as to his real intetntions. He should provide 
means for ferrying troops across the atream for the initial cross- 
ings, and should provide 6ne or more' bridges for each division, 
and furnish the necessary antiaircraft defense. 

The commander of a large force must use desterity and dis- 
patch in crossing a river. The celerity wiUi which troops may 
be moved over great distances by raodcrn transportation should 
enable the commander to make a surprise crossing which w-iU 
react on the defense of other parts of the river, compel a 

88 4 HAHtf Ar t«iS CGHirs(ANt>B!ftS OP LARGE UNITS 

general witiidmwa!, and open the way for the passage of the 
commaud along the entire front, Saheiif s toward the attacking 
forces, which enable them to concentrate hre on the defenders, 
and ground dominating the opposite bank are favorable places 
for forcing a croesing. A cotDmander should generally move fiia 
troope at night into positions for forcing a crossing, send the first 
troops across during the houra of darlcneaa, and oommeiise the 
passage shortly before dawn, in order to Facilitate tbe strbEPsquent 

The commaiuIiT of a unit wliif.h ia a part of a larger force will 
hold out tin; m-t'esKiiry reserve, support the crossing by artillery 
and machiiie-guu fire, protect daylight crossing by smoke, and 
direct the first troops across to take up positions to cover the 
crossing of the rest of the command. If he has more than one 
bridge, he vrill assign crossing zones to infantry ludts, with artil- 
lery and engineer units attached. 

113. Defense. — If a good defensive poeltioo exists along a 
river, a commander should teke fuU advantage of the river as 
an obstacle in front of his position, provided the course of the 
river conforms to the tactical and strategic situatioii. If the 
ri\'er is wide, its banks may in themselves form a good defensive 

If there is bo good defensive position along the river, a com- 
mander will probably find that the best use of the river will be 
as an aid to counteroffensive action in striking the enemy's 
forces while they are astride the river. He should hold his 
troops in favorable positions at such distances to the rear that 
they may intervene where a crossing may be attempted. He 
should wstcn the river carefully with relatively weak detach- 
ments. He should push reconnaissance patrols beyond the river, 
make full use of air observations to detect enemy movements 
and p obable points of crossing, and employ bombardment and 
attack aviation against enemy crossings and bridge. 

Section II 

114, Military features. — Diret't attack against wood.s and 
villages is particularly difficult. They screen the dispositions of 
the defender, afford material protectiOlQ to his men, and enable 
him to create artificial means for ^xeetlitg the prog^ress of the 
attacking troops along desired channels. They are' ^ispecially 
favwable to d^^ing action. 


115, Attack. — Unless a direct attack is necessary, a com- 
mander WiU reduce woods and villages by fire and ouiflanking 
operationB, or neutralize them by gas and smoke. The edge of 
a wood ia attacked like any other position and then used aftj* 
line of departore for sex ad\^mce through the woods. Agfrfjaet 
a tenacious enemy in a large wood, it may be neoMsary to make 
a methodical step-by-step advance under the protection of artili- 
lery fire, placed so as to cut off the enemy's front-line units from 
his support and reserves. 

Woods and villages afford excellent bases of departure for an 
attack. They screen troops in shelter, mask their concentration 
for battle, and conceal the positions of reserves, supplies, and 

119, Befause. — ^A commander should takeJull advantage of 
woods and villages as sapportbig points in a line of defense, as 
delaying^ pointa^ and as points <d dspmiws fox eounterattacksi 
He shotdd use such obstacles as a means to direct the prog^es? 

of the enemy along desired channels. He should establish suc- 
cessive lines of resistance in the interior of the woods and vfllagee 
and provide protection for their flanks and rear. lie should care- 
fully avoid placing firing lines at the edges of woods and villaj^es, 
where they are exposed to accurate artillery fire. 

Large woodS) 6ig>eoially those with tall trees and dense under- 
brush, afford protection against the eSesot? of &», ti# tiuetijt;* 
seiT<$e to gaft eoiP^tcatjions^ 

Section' III 


117. Attack, — Mountains are the easiest to defend and the 
most difficult to attack of all the obstacles found in nature. Suc- 
cess in : mountain -operations depends upon sudden and unex- 
pected attack, a thorough knowledge of roads and trails thro«^ 
the mountains, and the estt^lisbment of gOQd cpmrnunicetiojas 
after the attacking forces have passed ths mountains. Com- 
manders m chief should endeavor to turn mountain positions, by 
operations in lower and more level regions, where communica- 
tioas are bettor and defensive positions less effective. They 
should employ upon each important road through the mountains 
a tactically independent column capal.)le of conducting an opera- 
tion by its own means and of defending its own commanications. 
They should supply each oolu;E|p,;:(rttJ^ ample automotive trans- 
pt^Mion, where it can be used, pack irtiUery and pack trains, 


service troops for tho (juiisi rimiiori and repair of roads, and anti- 
aiieraft artillery for thu dtfeusL- of passtis. Th«y; ibould place 
adequate idtetaft at tha disposal of each coliuim:C(»3inmiider f^r 
ihe«'fetaek'<'ol!pjWMb," i . ■ ' -: r.,. .,• ^ 

118. Defettse.^Iu defense, a Id^sr commander musti M^oii 
hie guard agftinst bdng lulled into a f alee eecurity by the natural 
diffieuK ICS (li mountain frontiers. He must block (ho coiiiiiuini- 
cations ami pauses, occupy the heights dominating tlji-in, provide 
ampic artillery, antiaircraft, niachinc-guii, and inra.ntry defense, 
and exercise a ceaseless vigilance against surprise attack. He 
should cstablisli his first line of defense upon the farther side of 
the farthest chain of momitaina in the cUureotkm oC. the enemjr. 
He must prepare plane and Improve conunuBications for oQ^nt^ 
attat^ agiunst mj eobUDBi that may penetrate the defetisee. 
In no other! kind of ^aHfare oaa p^rBonnel bei econcoxdadd to 
better advanti^ ft' judit^oiiB nse of material and pr^paMl 

Suction IV 


1 t6i Advantages and MmitatlonB. — Operation s at night and 
at other tlirtes #hen vision is limited may be undertaken to 
concentrate troops eecretly for battle, to eross zones swept by 
enemy fire by day, to organiae the ground, tb^^«sa a success 
previously obtained, to regain lost gronnd, td^paSMe''the'«hemyj 
or to gain favorable positions for attack. 

Night combat is cli:;ra(,-toriK(.-d Uy a. deyroasc in cfTcctiveness 
of aimed fire, by difficulty in movement, troop leading, and the 
maintenance of direction, cohesion, and communication, and 
by a greater susceptibility to panic on the part of the troops. 
Niglit conditions are eSpecWfly favorable to aerial bombard- 
nient, btit th^y decrease 'Uie'effeetiveheBs of aerial reconnaissance. 

120. Atfack.^Surprise and pi^evtous daylight re connai seance 
are to snceess in night operations. The commander 
must not disclose liis intentions by his daylight preparations. 
He Bhoul! ■■inii-li- hnt donso formations, formulate his orders 
with e?;trt'nic deiiiiiteni;ss and detail, and employ his best 
troops. He ehould obtain coordination between his variouH 
units and columns by assigning to each a definite attack direction 
and a limited objective, and by tie use of liaison groups between 
adjacent units, combat p&troM, special ttei^alii wid ocnon^otlng 
mee at reduced iiiteimte wad -di^tftnoeB. ■ ■ !' -i* '■.-•::t 

.11 I II .;■<..., c.u; ,-;■.», ,.:"-.() 'nf i::tj 4; ntiiUtfyj 


In order to guard against the demoralization of supporting 
traepB'ln the event of a repulse, and to limit enemy pursuit, 
iMerves, In nlgbt operations, should be echeloned to the rear 
and' flanks of W^tooJkiliig vadta m V6 to be witiiin supporting 
distoDce-witiioat beli« invelved in the possible flow of retreat, 
A major ofTeao^ve Witii » distswt objective is seldom launched 
at night. The troops use the hours of darkness to eseeute 
preparatory measuraa for great offensives, move into Hssembly 
posiiii.^i.^ fire artillery preparation, carry out local attacks 
preparatory to the main attack, and execute operations to de- 
ceive the enemy as to the time and place of the main attack. 

Army and higher commanders should carefully study wcatlier 
conditions, when they contemplate major offenBives, in order to 
take advantage of fog and other causes that limit vision. They 
must take precautions gainst a sudden clearing. Conditions 
which limit vfcieo - restrict- theis own «»d the enemy's aeri^ 

181. Defense.— To avoid surprise, a commander on the 
defensive must look to vigilant reconnaissance, night illumtaa- 
tion, careful preparation. tl;e fux t.f weSpota, obstacles, 

denser formations, and counterattack. 

Section V 
122. Joint miwslon of Army and Navy>-It is tte ipsneraa 

function of the Army in coast defense tb conduct land operaiitoije 
in defense of United States territory. It is a general func«0«i 
of the Navy in coast defense to conduct sea operations in defense 
of United States territory and interests upon the sea; the spe- 
clflc functions of naval local defense forces are to control coastal 
Eones and sea lanes, to conduct sea operations directed toward 
the def&t of any enemy force in the vicinity of the coast, and 
to support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives. 
Coast defense is, thefefdre, a joint Army and Navy mission. 
Its purposes are to protect our coastwise shipping, to destroy 
the enemy forces operating on our coasts, and to repulse all 
enemy attacks ;if;ainst our shores. 

Close cooperation between Army and Navy commanders in 
the prcpiu'ation and execution of defcn-e i)lans is c£^enU-al. 
To insure eSective coordination between the Army and Navy 
te coast defense, a joint organizatioh has been wtablished. 


subdividing the frontiera and designating Army and Navy 
c-.mii'.aiiders responsible in these subdivisions for peaee-timo 
pianniijg and the execution of such security measijrea as may 
be noccMsary on the outbreak of war. This aubdi vision provides 
coastal frontiers, sectors, subsectors, and defensive coastal 
las^ait ia which both Army and Navy forces jjaay find joint 
;^pl@;ment. It iitao coD^nplates defensive seat areas whlefa 
«te eaaentiiJly naval with i^eot to respon^Uities and forces. 
The i^ans that may be avaiiable for coast defense are the 
fleet, naval local defense forces pertaining to the naval districts, 
harlior-defense troops, and field forces. 

123. Reconnaiaaance. — The primary duty of the recon- 
noiteriiis fortes, land and naviU. is to observe and report the 
movements of thii enemy. They should not engage in offensive 
operations whieh will interfere with this primary duty. They 
Bhould spare no means to obtain earjy informatiGn of the where- 
abouts of the enemy forc6 at sea and to follow thaimoyements of 
this force, for the purpose of deteimlning the proi^able places of 

124. Hav^ operations. — The fleet by its operations at sea 
may protect strategically all or part of our coast line. To do so, 
it must retain its freedom of movement. When a fleet or any 
of its important units permit tliemselvos to be immobilized in 
harbor by close bloel<ade, they invite siege operations. Within 
a harbor, beleaguered by land and sea, naval units are a hability 
rather than an asset. 

Tb$ nayi4 loDE^ defenfe forces pertain to the naval distriets 
«nd e^ssjfft of sJxen^ and any available ships, such as smaU 
submarines, mine vessels, aircraft tenders, and local vessels 
taken over In time of war for naval purposes. Their pri- 
mary functions are to gain and maintain contact with enemy 
forces, to report all movements of vessels in the adjacent coastal 
zone, and to conduct sliipping. They also use every available 
means, consistent with their primary functions, to interfere with 
the enemy forces at sea in order to prevent or delay their 
ILpproacli.: 4; .■|«tsjE, %5e^. of^ local defense forces, 

isnoBd ^'J^^m ^Aisi^^*^^ with the conduct of 

shipping, and worlcs dosely with the harborrdefense forces by 
palrolling the outer harbor area and by .giving information 
of all marine movements. 

120, Close defense. — -When an attack in force is threatened, 
combat aviation ami the submarine force are kept united and 
well in hand to seize favorable opportunities to attack the enemy 

forces, especiaUy carriers and transports. Such opportunitiesi 
wiU be offered by the enemy, if he attempts to land simultaneoufily 
at two or more places so widely separated as to make it impossible 
for his navy to provide adequate surface, subsurface, and air 
proteettcm. Lonip^range artiUenr and bombing airplanes will 
be used to keep cralft-tfal^fttiiti^ ** tatidfe|='d#mr eff-^ 
possible. The harbor-defense troops maintain and operate the 
essential harbor defenses designed to prevent ingress, by air, 
land, or water, into areas covered by the fixed defenses. The 
field forces reinforce the harbor-fiofcnse troops and oppose enemy 
landings tir.i'. ;;ir jit i;icks. 

126. Beach defense. — Hi story is replete with lost oppor- 
tunities for making effective be.if h defense. When landings in 
force are threatened, favorable landing, places should be guarded 
by the field forces, and tiie less favorable observed. A det6i^• 
mined defense at the water's etdgjs, supported by strong reserves, 
is the basis of ft successful beach defense. The ground in the 
vicinity of each favorable or critical landing place should be 
organiaed with a view to firing upon the enemy as he approaches 
and lands. Obstacles, both on shore and under the water, 
covered by fire, are important features of such defenses. All 
organized localities should be prepared for a determined defense 
and amply supplied with maoMne-guo and other infantry 
weapons. Successive positionB should be constructed to the 
rear and on the flanks of favorable landing places to delay the 
enemy advance, if he effects a landing. Higher commanders 
should inspect personally the arrangements for beach defense. 

In the defense against landing operations, the most important 
targets foi' arliilei y and aviation bombardment are, normally , 
trari;;])ort'! or eairiers, small boats approaching the shore, and 
troi.jis ;i* ( licy land. 

127. Reserves. — The defense commander should place his 
reserves in a central position, improve the roads to critical areas, 
provide detrucking points, and hold ample motor truasportatiou 
in hand for quickly transferring his leserves to strike a decisive 
blow at the enemy's main effort, wherever it may come. He 
must guard against piecemeal action and dispersion of efi'ort in 
the employment of liis reserves. If the enemy secures a foot- 
hold ashore, the local forces should Ixjx him in by occupying 
trenches previously prejiared. They should promptly counter- 
attack while he is handicapped by the disorganization incident 
to landing, and lacks space to maneuver. If the enemy succeeds 
in establishing beach tiead, the defense commandetr wi^ make 



every effort to prevent its extension, particularly towards s 
liarbor offering better landing facilities. If the enemy effects 
a landing at more than one place, the defense commander must 
determine which is the most important. He must ignore, 
contain, or delay the less important attaijks, aBd ittlke iriih bis 
forces uidted ag^inrt tbe etiemy^s ouiitibo^.- t 

: ., .1' 


(On^nizatipns ctmngej for detailed data consult curreat Tablet 
of Organization) 


Untts and oompoatttin ' ^giegsie strength 

1, Fmu> AuMY (war streiQgthJi.--— 336, 035 

Army licadqviarterB i:Ji_'_Il^ii.-ii (105) 

■Special troops .'1 . J J,'i-_'_i^-i_.^_-ii--' '(10, 828> 

Headquarters. " ' ' ' • - ■ 

Hcadquartt'rii company. 

1 railitiiry jjolifi- company, -' 

8 service battalions, Q. Mi C 

1 field remount depot. ■ 
Army artillery ... ILi... (847) 

Army artillery headqttirtiEirs. ' ' "' ^ 

Atliy ■tooiiiy'rtition traiii. ' ■ ' ■ f! 

Attached ordnance company, 
Ainiy ordnance service (1, 219) 

Anny ordiianct! heariquartors. 

I ordna.ncc company (headquarters), ' 

3 ordn.inte companies (ammunition). 

3 ordnance companies (depot). 

1 ordnance company (maintenance). 
Brigade, antiaircraft artillery i (fi, 68^ 

Headquarters and headquarters battery, 

f iHi^meaia.' • ' ' '• ■•■ ■"■'■■■ "■- 
1 regiment. • 

HeadqimrterS iMtd hMdquartm 

SerVlde battery. 

1 ^iU'ljattalion. -' 

«m*— ati — s 7* 



Uii[U anil compDsitloa iggneate atnmgth 

I. Field Army — Continued. 

.Army engineer service (13, 377) 

Army engineer lieadqu«;|ers. 
# genial w^i^lli^^ 
1 regiment. 

Regimental headquarters and 

Headquarters and ^vloe com- 

' 2 battftliona, ' = 

6 aeparaf o battalions. 
2 heavy ponton battalions. 
2 light ponton companies. ,. , -.-.).- 
1 camouflage bat tahon. . j, . 

1 depot company. 
I water supply battalion. 
I topographical battalion. 
1 shop company. 
1 dtimp truck company. 
1 motor repair section attached. 

Army aviation (2, 057) 

.j; Headquarters. , , i 

1 observation grou^ , .ivi. 
Headquarters Jwft4s!^^s*B 
.J Service squadron, 

4 observation squadTona. 
4 airdrome squadrons. 

1 attaclied ordnance company {maintenance). 

Army medical service , {11, 640) 

Headquarters, army medijaal^swiii'ijse, 
■ .1 4 mediea! regiments. 
.- 1 regiment. 

Regimental headquarters ao<| 

„, , ; J^iryice companjf,, ., , , 1 
. Veterinary company^ 
Collecting battalion. 
Ambulaiics Ibattalion, 

't" c> — on — ■ • '1 ■ rn 

1 PiBLD Army — Conthraed. 

icnny medieal' service — Gontmued. 

12 evami&tton boiiiilfai^ ' - a , - 
10 surgical hospitfits. ' i r 

l-flOnvftlesnent hospital. ■ 

1 medical laboratory. 

1 medical supply depot. 

3 veterinary evacuation hospitals. 

1 veterinary oonvalescent hOSpitaL' ■ 

Army signal service (1,681) 

. Headquarters, army s^stl-son^Mw 

2 signal battfUioiis. 

I meteorological compimy, 

1 photographic company. 

1 pigeon company. . i 

1 radio company, 

Army train, Q. M, C_ (6,79«) 


3 motor transport commands. 
19 motor transport compames; 

2 motor cycle companiea. 

: .°H I 4 motOT repair seotioms: . ' 

44iiotor repair battalions. 

Attached Medi eat Department personnel (881) 

Attached ctuipbiitis. (38) 

3 army corp.s (261, 060) 

2 trivalrv divisions (19, 524} 

!. Akmt Cohps (war streagtia) 87, 020 

Headquarters . (60) 

l^cial troops (8,282) 

Headquutiere. < i 

Signal' bsttdicm^ - ' 'I ' l jM 

Military police battalion. 

Service battalion, Q. M. C. 

Field remount depot. 

Ordnance company (anununltion). 

Qrdiifuice company (heavy maintenance). 

:iu illnil i 

Units rind com position aggrogsto etreugtb 

Akut Corps — Continued. . : I 

C!orpe artillt;ry . (6, 620) 

Corps artillery headquarters. 

H^quarteTs.Emd.)l«»dQl3«l4fi(a fi^ir; 

AmTOupitiop tratN - 

2 regiments, lES-mio. howitzers. 

1 regiment, A 
,SOi litjgilufental Li':iil(ju;irtevs 

axid headquarteru battery ^ 
Service battery.; I 

1 re^ment, l65>iiug».:Sam. 

Begimental hoft^uaitej^ . and 

«T ii> Jieadquarters battey. ■ . ; 

&irvioe battery. 
S bsttHaiiona. 

1 oidiiaais.' compaoy (maintenance)^ 

Antiaircraft regiment (1,829) 

Bcgimcntal headqmfterfi sad imd^ 
qiiarterE batteil3Et(-j< I ii/-; f il-.i:';A. 

; Service ..battey. . .. . -•• , I'. 'i . 1. .i i / 

>i«<t , .. .1 gunjbtatt^kiii.. . . vn. 

- ■• 1 machine-gun battalion. 

Corps engineer service .-j-^ij. ii^j....... (^742) 

Corps tniuijifei- headquarters. - 

Ssepiirait; Ijntliilions. 

1 general scrvieu rcgi merit. 

Regimental headquarters sad bssd. 
Headquarters and service company. 

2 battalions., . . .. ■ ^ vw. 

1 light pOnt<}It.{d>l]^a||^.i:<ill/:l»i<.) mi-n- - 
I di^pt company. .' ; > "ui-j-i tl u i 
Corps aviatifo.i'iLiLi^aAfi^^-^-i.-^w.^iaitu^'^ttj (1, 741) 
Corps aviation hsadilufjMtStoa mumtrnJ 
1 observation group, 
1 tolloon group. 



. .. Cnits and composition «sgt«Kat« itnngtJi 

2. Abmt Corps — Continued. .. i 

' a^i.tijOorps medical service 1 (989) 

Headquarters, corps medical service. 

1 medit\'\l regiment. 

Kegimental headquarters and b&nd^ '. 

Service coti^paD^. i, ti-; r.t S 

Veterinary cpmpany, -lUin^j-jii 

Collecting batfcalioni! ^ '■■•■■■.<' 

Ambulance battalion. ' '- 

Hospital battalion. 

Corps train, Q. M. C— 

Train iicridquartera. 

S motor iiv port commands. 

25 motor transport conapaniea. 

2 motor cycle companiee. 

8 motor reptur sections. i i. 

.1'.. . Wagon train, iii'Muiy-i I r'li'' rii I 

Attached Medical Department personnd ^ „ ^ (465) 

Attached chaplains . i (14) 

3 infantry divisions ---liii (64,669) 

3. Infanthy Division (war strength) _ 21,523 

Division headquaj^ters CLi (43) 

Special troops ; — 1 — (946) 

Headquarters. i 
HeadquaiteiB oompaayj ■ ■ . • .i:. " '^t'' 1 

light .•t«i:d£'<i[>Bq»aiIlf^<-i ' .!! 

Militaiy police company^ . " mj i - < ' : i 
Ordnance company (maintenance!). ■ ■ - ' 
-UT) Service company, Q. M. C. ■ 

Signal company. i' 

a^jnfantry brigades (12tS33) 

1 brigade. 

Beadquarten angu^ipadqMiirtwB 'oom* 
pany. .iouiijijiiM ■ ■' l' 

t-^H) . .21nfMitayiregimeqB*»<i I- ;;t '■ 1 J- 

Ije^i&ent... .MuiJii ,ti:. l.'Hi•.'■itJ.• 
|": .B£gimental(i.'jbsa^i>B>rtorK!!'i£MrjM.<-f/.0 .k 

band. . 'u. , ' .. 

... Headquarters company^- i-.s i mu j linv-- . \ 

t'fJl) ^ .Service company, tiooiJ leiialti 

Howitzer company. 
8 IMfttaUonB. 



Units !^Ti<t com ji'>^i< ion AgErigftte B^«n^ll 

3 iNFiiNTKT Division- — Coiitioucd. 

'Uliii I artillery brigade - :(54<Sft) 

Brigatte huad quarters and lieadquarterB 

AiKmu^iiUpR train. 

Headquarters and Nuodr ■' > 
EeadquatterB batterer. 

Service battery, 
2 battalions. > 

1 regiment, 155-mni, howitzers. 

Regimental lieadquartera and head- 
quarters battery. 
Service battsi^. 
3 battalions. 

I medical regiment — ^^iw*-- (Ml) 

£e^meni>Bl headquftftora andiband. 

Service company. 

Veterinary company. 

Collecting battalion. 

Ambulance battalion. 

Hospital battalion. 

Division surgeon's office. 
1 combat regiment, Corps of Eiigitiee»i.»i.itb.t 

RegimeoitEiA iteadquartesB and^^Mx^ !<ir< '' I 

Headqu&rtim and sesyimMiMp^T^w - < . ! . 

2 battalions: -i •, , ■" 
Diviaion train, Q. M. C if(&) 

Train head(|uarters. 
'i;iV.'!! 4 Jiiotur traiiiiijort companies. i '♦' 

2 motor repair sections. 

1 motorcycle companjc I i 

2 wagon companiw. 

Attached Medical DepisEtnaentiJraniosnely i. ^. _ (014) 
Attached chaplains -.^li^^^^j.,,^^ (1£) 

4 C^VAitRT GoBPS (wfHT strength)) 29, 763 

Corps headquarters {107) 

Headquarters troop-. (112) 

StBBalfaw*-- — - (169) 

•siii.tfi'.ihi.i t; 

A WLnrsAi, mvumpvs&ov- hixsp units 81 

■VnM md coiiipositl<m tap^te stnnctb 

4.. Catal&t Coeps— Contjaued. 

Headquartore and UesdQuaiifira battery. Field 

Artillei^ brigade _ (89) 

8 cavalry divisions ' . (29, 286) 

B, 'Gavalhy Division (wiir strength) 9,762 

Division heaciquarttji's (27) 

special troops „ (646) 

Headquarters and lieadquarters troop. 
Signal troop. 
Light tank company. 
Ordnance comply (mainten^ce] . 
2 cavalry brigades iS, 7^ 

1 brigade. 

Bri^de beadqufl^rs and haadquac- 

t^ troop. 
3 <»valry regiments. 
1 regiment. 

Regimental headqusrteti 

and band. 
Headquarters troop. 
Machine-gun troop. 
3 squadrons. 

1 itegiment, 75-mm. guns (horse) . (1, 6^) 

Headquarters and headquarters battery. 
Service battery, 

2 battalions. 

Combat engineer batMion (SKUuated)— &4^) 


Headquarters a&d seryiise platoon. 

3 coini>anies. 

Division air service-.....^ ^, (222) 


1 obaervsMon aqnsdron. 

1 photiQ secttoii. 
AsmoT<ed car squadron (278) 


3 troops. 

Uedical squadrons ^.......^....^ (^0) 

Colleoting troop. 
Ambulimee ttoap. 

S3 i^m^mMws(mmm!mm9Wif*^m^mW'% 


6 Cavaley DmaioN— C3oiitiii3M(cUj,ii . • , , <,,.,,:■} i 

■ HoepJtal tropp, , 

<-'•'■. .. yeterinw troop- " . 

C-.'T ,11 blvi^citi.tTtuD, Q. M. C (400), 

fV-. Trsfn headquarters. 

inii) 2, Motor iraiisjio i t. colli panies. ,^ 
1 motor repair sectiion. 
1 wagoD company, , ■ .. 

4 pack trains. , . a,u:i j::u:.\ 

Attached MediQal.I>eg!ii£tm6Qi,&ea(:K>9$^ (281) 

-1/ ;..!, , ,;Q, 


:■ S 

I.- '-/- . 


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